Sexual Consent as Voluntary Agreement: Tales of “Seduction” or Questions of Law? by Vandervort, Lucinda
SEXUAL CONSENT AS VOLUNTARY
AGREEMENT: TALES OF ‘‘SEDUCTION’’ OR
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This article proposes a rigorous method to map the law on to the facts in the
legal analysis of sexual consent using a series of mandatory questions of law
designed to eliminate the legal errors often made by decision makers who
routinely rely on personal beliefs about and attitudes toward ‘‘normal sexual
behavior’’ in screening and deciding cases. In Canada, sexual consent is affir-
mative consent, the communication by words or conduct of ‘‘voluntary agree-
ment’’ to a specific sexual activity, with a specific person. As in many
jurisdictions, however, the sexual assault laws are often not enforced. Reporting
is lowest and non-enforcement highest in cases involving the most common type
of assailants, those who are not strangers but instead persons the complainant
knows, often quite well—acquaintances, supervisors or coworkers, and family
members. Reliance on popular narratives about ‘‘seduction’’ and ‘‘stranger-
danger’’ leads complainants, police, prosecutors, lawyers, and trial judges to
truncate legal analysis of the facts and leap to erroneous conclusions about
consent. Wrongful convictions and perverse acquittals, questionable plea bar-
gains and ill-considered decisions not to charge, result. This proposal is designed
to curtail the impact of prejudgments, assumptions, and biases in legal
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reasoning about voluntariness and affirmative agreement and to produce deci-
sions that are legally sound, based on the application of the rule of law to the
material facts. Law has long had better tools than the age-old and popular tales
of ‘‘ravishment’’ and ‘‘seduction.’’ Those tools can and should be used.
Keywords: Sexual assault, rape, consent, seduction, Canadian criminal law,
legal reasoning, judicial decision-making, prosecutorial discretion, charging
decisions, police decision-making
The traditional approach to rape and sexual assault cases leaves most of the
crucial decisions to be determined by the world view supplied by dominant social
attitudes, myth, and custom, not by law. Thus, social attitudes cause not only the
problem itself—rape and sexual assault—but also ensure that the legal system
will fail to enforce its own laws.1
I N TRODUCT ION
In jurisdictions worldwide, sexual assault law in theory and sexual assault
law in action are not always the same.2 In Canada, there is often a wide gap
between the law on the books as interpreted by the Supreme Court of
Canada and its interpretation and enforcement at the grassroots level by
police, prosecutors, and lower court judges in sexual assault cases.3 As
1. Lucinda Vandervort, Mistake of Law and Sexual Assault: Consent and Mens Rea, 2:2
CAN. J. WOMEN & L., 233, 263 (1987–1988).
2.Gender violence is an international problem, with common themes and experiences as
well as the unique features that specific legal systems and cultural traditions present. Many
jurisdictions have high levels of sexual violence and low levels of reporting and prosecution.
The analysis presented in this article may be of use, directly or indirectly, in other jur-
isdictions where efforts are underway to address sexual violence as a violation of human
rights. Recent international studies documenting the breadth and severity of the problem
include: U.N. WOMEN, PROGRESS OF THE WORLD’S WOMEN 2011–2012: IN PURSUIT
OF JUSTICE 46–63 (2011), http://progress.unwomen.org/pdfs/EN-Report-Progress.pdf;
WORLD HEALTH ORG. & LONDON SCH. OF HYGIENE AND TROPICAL MED., PREVENT-
ING INTIMATE PARTNER AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: TAKING ACTION
AND GENERATING EVIDENCE 12–15 (2010), http://www.who.int/violence_injury_preven-
tion/publications/violence/9789241564007_eng.pdf; CORINNA SEITH, JOANNA LOVETT,
& LIZ KELLY, DIFFERENT SYSTEMS, SIMILAR OUTCOMES?: TRACKING ATTRITION IN
REPORTED RAPE CASES IN ELEVEN COUNTRIES (2009).
3. The gap is seen in victimization surveys of alleged incidents versus reported cases and
in attrition as cases progress through the criminal justice system. Three surveys, conducted
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a result, there is a widespread lack of public confidence in the response of
the criminal justice system to sexual violence, and proportionately few
sexual assaults are reported to the police. Potential complainants are not
confident they can expect more protection by the legal system from sexual
violence than their mothers and aunts enjoyed.4
In addition, research shows that although most sexual assaults are com-
mitted by someone known to the assailee,5 nonstranger assaults are the
least reported and prosecuted form of sexual assault.6 As a consequence, the
between 1993 and 2004, show less than 10% of alleged sexual assaults were reported to
police. ‘‘Founding’’ rates are lower than for other types of offenses. Since 1994, only 42% of the
cases labeled by police as ‘‘founded,’’ i.e., substantiated, resulted in charges. Of the ‘‘founded’’
cases, 11% led to a conviction. The Statistics Canada 2004 victimization survey found 460,000
incidents of sexual assault with 1,406 convictions. Accordingly, the attrition rate from alleged
incident to conviction is estimated at 99.7%. Holly Johnson, Limits of a Criminal Justice
Response: Trends in Police and Court Processing of Sexual Assault, in SEXUAL ASSAULT IN CANADA:
LAW, LEGAL PRACTICE & WOMEN’S ACTIVISM (Elizabeth Sheehy, ed., 2012).
4. Anecdotal evidence. See Johnson, supra note 3, text at nn.17, 18. Lack of confidence in
the response of the Canadian justice system to sexual violence is widespread and well
documented; see Sheehy, ed., supra note 3, passim.
5. Samuel Perreault & Shannon Brennan, Criminal victimization in Canada, 2009, Sept.
28, 2010, JURISTAT (Statistics Canada, Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Catalogue
no. 85-002-X, vol. 30, no. 2. (modified)), http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/85-002-x/2010002/
article/11340-eng.htm reports: ‘‘In over half (51%) of sexual assault incidents, the perpetrator
was a friend, acquaintance, or neighbor of the victim, compared to 29% of robberies and
31% of physical assaults. . . . The majority of sexual assaults were not reported to the police
(88%) (Table 10).’’ Samuel Perreault, Violent victimization of Aboriginal people in the Cana-
dian provinces, 2009, March 11, 2011, JURISTAT, http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/85-002-x/
2011001/article/11415-eng.htm, reports: ‘‘Both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal victims of
non-spousal violence often know their perpetrator. In 2009, 68% of Aboriginal victims and
52% of non-Aboriginal victims were victimized by a relative, a friend, an acquaintance,
a neighbor or another person known to them (Table 4).’’ Comparisons among groups are
now available for 2010: see Maire Sinha, Family Violence in Canada: A Statistical Profile,
2010, Statistics Canada, May 22, 2012, JURISTAT, http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/85-002-x/
2012001/article/11643-eng.pdf. Interpreting statistics requires caution; categories used for
reporting have changed recently; statistics based on police reports only capture offenses
that are reported to police and recorded. General Social Surveys are based on self-reports and
include unreported alleged offenses. SeeHOLLY JOHNSON & MYRNA DAWSON, VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN IN CANADA: RESEARCH AND POLICY PERSPECTIVES (2011).
6. A nonexhaustive list of sources includes: Teresa DuBois, Police Investigation of Sexual
Assault Complaints: How far have we come since Jane Doe?, in Sheehy, supra note 3; T.
Hattem, Highlights from a Preliminary Study of Police Classification of Sexual Assault Cases as
Unfounded, 14 JUST RES. (July 31, 2009), http://canada.justice.gc.ca/eng/pi/rs/rep-rap/jr/
jr14/p9.html; Z. Peterson & C. Muelenhard, Was It Rape? The Function of Women’s Rape
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enforcement gap is largest with respect to sexual assault offenses allegedly
committed by acquaintances and family members (nonstrangers) even
though the identity of the assailant in these cases clearly is known. This
is not a new development. Historical evidence shows that nonstranger
sexual assault has long been an under-recognized and under-
acknowledged category of sexual violence in Canada.7 Yet Canadian law
requires affirmative sexual consent to all sexual activity, not merely between
strangers. Sexual consent is defined as the communication, by words or
conduct, of ‘‘voluntary agreement’’ to a specific sexual activity, with a specific
person. Agreement must be expressed and ‘‘voluntary’’ to be legally effec-
tive.8 ‘‘When it’s not ‘YES!’ and VOLUNTARY, it’s ‘NO!’’’ and ‘‘When it’s
‘NO!’ it’s ‘NO!’’’ In theory, this is all quite clear and beyond question.
Nonetheless, some decision makers in the Canadian criminal justice system
fail to implement even the weaker ‘‘‘NO’ means ‘NO’’’ standard.
This article analyzes the cultural and legal basis of the gap between ‘‘law
on the books,’’ as interpreted by the Supreme Court of Canada, and ‘‘law in
action’’ at the grass roots and in the lower courts in sexual assault cases, and
concludes that the root cause is a collective failure to follow the rule of law.
In particular, the legal requirement that consent be voluntary and affirma-
tive is often ignored, and as a result many decisions about what does and
does not constitute sexual assault are not based on the law but on tradi-
tional cultural paradigms, especially stock stories about ‘‘seduction’’ and
‘‘enticement.’’ The enforcement gap with respect to assaults by nonstran-
gers appears to result from the influence of cultural paradigms and stock
Myth Acceptance and Definitions of Sex in Labeling their Own Experiences, 51(3/4) SEX ROLES
129 (2004); J. DuMont, K. Miller, & T. Myhr, The Role of ‘Real Rape’ and ‘Real Victim’
Stereotypes in the Police Reporting Practices of Sexually Assaulted Women, 9(4) VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN 466 (2003); TINA HATTEM, SURVEY OF SEXUAL ASSAULT SURVIVORS,
at 13, 15, 19 (Canada Dept. of Justice, 2002); R. Bachman, The Factors Related to Rape Re-
porting Behavior and Arrest: New Evidence from the National Crime Victimization Survey, 25:1
CRIM. JUST. BEHAV. 8 (1998); R. Gartner & R. Macmillan, The Effect of Victim-Offender
Relationship on Reporting Crimes of Violence Against Women, 37:3 CAN. J. CRIMINOLOGY 393
(1995).
7. CONSTANCE BACKHOUSE, CARNAL CRIMES: SEXUAL ASSAULT LAW IN CANADA
1900–1975 (2008).
8. Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 273.1. See Lucinda Vandervort, Affirmative Sexual
Consent in Canadian Law, Jurisprudence, and Legal Theory, 23:2 COLUM. J. GENDER & L.
395 (2012), for a detailed examination of the development of the law of affirmative sexual
consent in Canada since the early 1980s. A brief overview as of 2012 appears below.
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narratives about so-called ‘‘normal sexual behavior’’ on how decision ma-
kers—from complainants, police, and prosecutors, to judges and jurors—
think and talk about sexual activity and sexual assault. Starting with the
complainant, these paradigms, narratives, and related patterns of thought
and speech invite each decision maker, in turn, to truncate the process of
legal analysis and leap to conclusions based on nonlegal factors. The effects
include failure to report offenses and failure to enforce the law.
The article is organized in two parts. Part I analyses the problem in the
Canadian context. Representative scenarios are examined within the frame-
work provided by current Canadian law, culture, and public discourse to
identify the practices used in legal reasoning that permit cultural paradigms
and narratives based on the concept of ‘‘seduction’’ and related assumptions
and attitudes about ‘‘normal sexual behavior’’ to affect conclusions about
voluntariness and affirmative agreement in the actus reus of sexual assault.
Part II turns to solutions and proposes specific changes in the practices
jurists routinely use to structure legal analysis of consent or ‘‘voluntary
agreement’’ in the actus reus of sexual assault.
Part II proposes that trial judges presiding in sexual assault cases be
required to determine, as a question of law, whether there is sufficient
evidence of the actual communication of voluntary agreement for a defense
of consent to be available, and whether the circumstances of the offense are
consistent with the legal prerequisites of voluntariness in the complainant.
A ruling that finds either (1) insufficient evidence of affirmative consent—
the communication of voluntary agreement—for the defense of consent to
be available in law, or (2) the circumstances established by the evidence
were inconsistent with the legal prerequisites of voluntariness, would estab-
lish the absence of consent for purposes of proof of the actus reus. Judges
who failed to rule on these issues and instead simply presumed that the
complainant communicated agreement and that her words and conduct
were voluntary, would thereby err in law, rendering the decision subject to
appeal. Judicial adoption of this approach, together with some related trial
practices, detailed below, would curtail the impact of cultural paradigms
and stock narratives on legal analysis of consent in the actus reus of sexual
assault, and result in decisions based on application of the rule of law to the
facts. Scenarios used in Part I to illustrate the influence of the seduction
paradigm in legal decision making are revisited in Part II to demonstrate
the operation and effect of the proposed practices in legal analysis of the
evidence in typical sexual assault cases.
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This article addresses issues arising in relation to sexual consent but
arguably has broader relevance. Gaps between ‘‘law on the books’’ and
‘‘law in action,’’ are not uncommon in law, especially when formal law
conflicts with cultural norms and practices. Patterns of thought and speech
like those used in relation to sexual assault and nonenforcement of sexual
assault laws often shape nonsexual interactions between individuals who
are not equal in social power, even though they may be formally ‘‘equal’’ in
law. Some of the institutional barriers to effective enforcement of the rule
of law in those contexts are similar to those that impede enforcement of the
sexual assault laws. The rule of law and the law of consent are central to
liberal democracies in theory; in practice, the roles of law and consent are
routinely undermined by deeply embedded cultural habits of assuming
entitlement and deferring to power. ‘‘Normal’’ social behavior, like the
‘‘normal’’ sexual behavior examined in this article, often presumes consent
and claims compliance with the rule of law when, in actuality, there is
neither. The steps required to address those issues in the context of the
nonenforcement of sexual assault laws arguably suggest steps that could be
taken to address similar impediments to the practical implementation of
other laws.
I. OUTLINE AND ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM
A. Sexual Assault under Canadian Law
The Canadian Criminal Code is a federal statute.9 Parliament and the
Supreme Court of Canada create law that binds the entire country.
The Supreme Court of Canada is the final judicial arbiter in matters of
criminal law. On December 12, 1991, the federal Department of Justice
tabled Bill C-49, a comprehensive set of amendments to the sexual assault
provisions of the Criminal Code. In the form enacted by Parliament
five months later, the Bill included a Preamble setting out the objectives
of the legislation, a provision curtailing use of evidence of complainants’
sexual history, a detailed codification of the definition of consent, and
statutory bars codifying limits on the use of the defense of belief in
9. Provincial legislatures may enact ‘‘quasi-criminal’’ legislation that includes limited
punitive measures for the purpose of enforcing laws enacted to regulate activities and issues
within provincial jurisdiction; criminal law, as such, is within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the federal government.
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consent.10 Representative cases decided at common law show that when
the decision or judgment in a sexual assault or common assault case dealt
with the issue of consent, the term was used to refer to a voluntary choice or
free act of volition by a person who appreciates the situation and the risks
inherent to it, and is not subject to coercion.11 The definition of ‘‘consent’’
enacted by Parliament in 1992 largely codified the common law definition
of ‘‘consent.’’12 In 1997, the Criminal Code was further amended to limit
the use of complainants’ personal records at trial.13
Under current Canadian law, a conviction for sexual assault requires
proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused committed the actus reus
with the necessary mens rea. The actus reus of sexual assault is the touching
of a person who does not consent in circumstances of a sexual nature.14 To
be legally effective, both at common law and as codified by section 273.1 of
the Criminal Code, consent must be voluntary, communicated by the
words or conduct of a person with legal capacity. In addition, subsection
265(3) of the Criminal Code lists circumstances—including submission by
reason of force, fear, threats, fraud, or the exercise of authority—under
which the law will deem consent to be absent, despite a complainant’s
ostensible consent or participation.15 The complainant’s reason for osten-
sibly consenting by complying or participating does not need to be either
reasonable or communicated to the accused in order for consent to be
vitiated for the purposes of proof of the actus reus. The validity of consent
in the actus reus depends on the complainant’s subjective state of mind
toward the touching at the time it took place.
10. Bill C-49, An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (sexual assault), S.C. 1992, c.38, as
passed by the House of Commons, June 15, 1992 (effective Aug. 15, 1992). The Preamble is
not reproduced in the Criminal Code, but affects statutory construction of the provisions
and must be considered when constitutional issues are raised. See Vandervort, Affirmative
Consent, supra note 8, at 412–13, for the Preamble and substantive provisions of the Act.
11. See Vandervort, Affirmative Consent, supra note 8, at 407–11, on ‘‘consent’’ in
Canadian common law.
12. R. v. Esau, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 777, dissenting reasons by MacLachlin J., as she then was.
The relationship of the common law and statute law defining sexual consent is discussed in
Vandervort, Affirmative Consent, supra note 8, at n.27.
13. Bill C-46, An Act to Amend the Criminal Code (Production of Records in Sexual Offence
Proceedings), S.C. 1997, c.30, enacting ss.278.1–278.91 to the Code.
14. R. v. Chase, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 293.
15. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c.C-46, s.265( 3).
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The complainant’s testimony is the only source of direct evidence of her
state of mind. The accused may claim that the complainant’s words and
conduct at the time of the offense provided a basis to infer that she did
want the sexual touching to take place or, at least, a basis for reasonable
doubt about the credibility of her assertion that subjectively she did not
want the sexual touching to take place. But if the trier of fact concludes that
the evidence proves that the complainant did not subjectively consent, the
absence of consent is proven, even though her conduct, in whole or part,
may be inconsistent with that conclusion. This may occur, for example,
when her objectively observable words or conduct are not voluntary. The
absence of any evidence of words or conduct that communicate affirmative
consent or voluntary agreement to the activity, as, for example, when
a complainant is silent or passive, conclusively establishes the absence of
consent for the purposes of proof of the actus reus.16 Submission is not
consent.17
‘‘Consent’’ functions differently in the context of the actus reus and mens
rea of the offense. For the purposes of the actus reus, ‘‘consent’’ means that
the complainant not only communicated agreement by her words or con-
duct but also did so voluntarily; that is, subjectively, in her own mind, she
actually did want the sexual touching to take place. The complainant’s state
of mind is crucial in relation to voluntariness, but her words and conduct
are the means by which agreement is communicated. In the context ofmens
rea, the term ‘‘consent’’ refers to objectively observable words or conduct by
the complainant that affirmatively communicate her voluntary agreement
or consent to engage in the sexual activity in question with the accused at
the time in question.
The mens rea of the accused with respect to the issue of consent is
governed by the common law and provisions of the Criminal Code.18
To assert that the complainant consented is to assert a belief in consent. If
the belief in consent is based on a mistake about the law of consent—for
example, the belief that ‘‘no’’ means ‘‘yes,’’ or that silence is consent, or that
failure to resist, or resist successfully, is consent—the defense of belief in
consent is not available. Pursuant to the common law and section 19 of the
16. R. v. M. (M.L.), [1994] 2 S.C.R. 3. See Vandervort, Affirmative Consent, supra note 8,
at 415–16 for further discussion of these issues.
17. Vandervort, Affirmative Consent, supra note 8, at .415–16.
18. Id.
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Criminal Code, ignorance of the law is not an excuse and does not excul-
pate an accused. If the alleged belief purports to be based on a mistake
about the facts, there must be evidence of the facts that allegedly provided
a basis for the mistaken belief. Any words or conduct by the complainant
that are alleged to have affirmatively communicated voluntary agreement to
engage in the activity in question will be material and relevant and must be
considered. When there is no support, or insufficient support, in the
evidence for the allegedly mistaken perception of the complainant’s words
or conduct as the communication of agreement, the defense of belief in
consent is not available and therefore may not be considered by the trier of
fact. Furthermore, the accused’s belief in consent may not be reckless,
willfully blind, or accompanied by an awareness of any of the circumstances
listed in subsection 273.1(2) under which the law deems there to be no
consent. These circumstances include express refusal by the complainant to
engage in the activity or to continue with it, consent by a third party, the
complainant’s incapacity to consent, and abuse of a position of trust,
power, or authority to induce the complainant to engage in the activity.
Section 273.1(3) provides that the circumstances in which no consent is
obtained are not limited to those specified under section 273.1(2).19
B. Thought, Speech, Culture, and Law
Propagandists and balladeers, evangelists and advertising executives have
long known that rhetoric can be used strategically to shape cultural atti-
tudes, beliefs, and practices. Rhetoric is linked to cognition; commonly
used phrases and sayings reflect and shape the legal consciousness of ordi-
nary citizens and the deliberation processes of decision makers within the
criminal justice system. Slogans encapsulating information about the legal
definition of sexual consent and sexual assault must therefore be crafted
with the same purposeful care used to create any tool; if they are poorly
designed they may simply reinforce traditional assumptions, beliefs, and
attitudes that have long shaped the sexual behavior of individuals and the
decisions made in sexual assault cases by police, prosecutors, and judges.
Slogans designed to inform the Canadian public about sexual assault law
are a case in point; they have already proven to be quite unruly. The slogan
‘‘‘NO’ means ‘NO’’’ is widely used by activists and educators in Canada,
19. For a detailed introduction to Canadian sexual consent law, see id.
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but can be misleading and ultimately regressive in its practical effects insofar
as it suggests there is no offense in the absence of resistance. By contrast,
‘‘When It’s Not ‘YES!’ and VOLUNTARY, It’s ‘NO!’’’ focuses attention on
the requirement for affirmative sexual consent, the actual communication of
voluntary agreement to sexual contact. The impact of these slogans and the
cultural paradigms and approaches to legal reasoning associated with them
on the legal analysis of typical sexual assault scenarios, illustrates the strategic
role rhetoric can and often does play as a tool to shape both ordinary sexual
conduct and legal reasoning and decision making in sexual assault cases.
Words matter, not in and of themselves, but because of their effects.
Some scholars and activists may assume that the influence of rhetoric
and cultural paradigms on ordinary behavior and legal reasoning is so
strong that the gap between law on the books and law in action will remain
until there is a new sexual culture and ‘‘new normal sexual behaviors’’
supported by new rhetoric more in tune with the law. This article argues
that such an approach is defeatist; it avoids the crucial legal task—the
development of tools that in combination can be effective to enforce the
sexual assault laws now, not merely at a distant and indefinite point in the
future. We already have laws and legal norms that in theory protect indi-
vidual rights of sexual self-determination. This article proposes specific
steps designed to secure more reliable interpretation and effective imple-
mentation of those laws. The development and widespread social accep-
tance of cultural and behavioral norms that are less in conflict with legal
norms is not a prerequisite for correct interpretation and application of
sexual assault laws as long as the power of the distinctions between cultural
and legal norms, and civil society and the legal system is appreciated and
used effectively.20
Effective implementation of the approach proposed here will require
many legal professionals to reexamine their assumptions about the laws,
facts, and the questions that must be addressed and resolved in analyzing
and disposing of a sexual assault case. That is a good thing. Traditional
20. Cultural norms do shape political priorities and affect decisions about the allocation
of state resources required to enforce the law, however. The positive duty of the state under
domestic and international law to protect persons under its jurisdiction from sexual assault,
and conflicts between human rights norms and those given priority by domestic justice
systems are relevant. See Lucinda Vandervort, Legal Subversion of the Criminal Justice Process?
Judicial, Prosecutorial, and Police Discretion in Edmondson, Kindrat, and Brown, Chapter 6 in
Sheehy, supra note 3, at 113–53.
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approaches are defunct. The time for widespread recognition of this reality
by police, prosecutors, defense counsel, and judges is already long overdue.
Leadership by judicial councils and law societies may be required to address
those aspects of these issues that require changes in judicial practices and
redefinition of the duties of counsel.
C. Thought, Speech, and ‘‘Normal’’/‘‘Seductive’’ Sexual Behavior
There is some resistance in popular culture, in the media, and among some
members of the legal profession and even the judiciary, to the changes in
sexual behavior that are required to give practical effect to equality rights.
Resistance and backlash commonly take the form of ridicule that uses the
specter of social paralysis to discount the feasibility and desirability of any
approach to sexual consent that is inconsistent with what is described as
‘‘normal sexual behavior,’’ sex as ‘‘usual’’ on the ‘‘usual’’ terms.21 Similar
patterns of resistance to sociolegal change are found in popular culture and
reported in the academic literature in Canada and the United States.22
Discussion of affirmative consent requirements, in particular, often elicits
21. Don Stuart, Ewanchuk: Asserting ‘No Means No’ at the Expense of Fault and Pro-
portionality Principles, 22 C.R. (6th) 39(1999), text at n.23, observes that in 1992 when leg-
islation to amend the sexual assault provisions of the Criminal Code was under discussion,
‘‘[t]here were strongly stated opinions in newspaper editorials that Parliament was to
criminalize seduction and that sexual conduct would now require advanced consent in
writing.’’ For further examples and discussion of media reaction to the Ewanchuk case, see
Joanne Wright, Consent and Sexual Violence in Canadian Public Discourse: Reflections on
Ewanchuk, 16:2 CAN. J.L. & SOC’Y 173 (2001).
22. Many authors published in the United States conclude that affirmative consent
requirements are not feasible. See SUSAN CARINGELLA, ADDRESSING LAW REFORM IN LAW
AND PRACTICE 79–82 (2009); Symposium on Rape, Affirmative Consent to Sex, and Sexual
Autonomy, 41:4 AKRON L. REV. 839 (2008); David P. Bryden, Forum on the Law of Rape:
Redefining Rape, 3 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 317 (2000); STEPHEN SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED
SEX: THE CULTURE OF INTIMIDATION AND THE FAILURE OF LAW (1998). Similarly,
extensive media commentary ridiculed the student-drafted Antioch College Sexual Offense
Policy, Oct. 4, 1993. The policy reflected keen awareness of practical issues related to
implementation of affirmative sexual consent requirements and included detailed guidance
on a range of pertinent issues. Antioch students were understandably irritated by the media
frenzy and widespread misrepresentation of the policy. The Antioch Board of Trustees
approved a revised policy on June 8, 1996. The revision of Jan. 1, 2006, reviewed the history
of the development of the policy. The current Sexual Offense Prevention Policy, 2012–2013
STUDENT HANDBOOK 36–38, is available at http://antiochcollege.org/assets/pdf/student-
handbook.pdf.
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the opinion that the communication of consent has no place in ‘‘normal’’
sexual behavior.23 Explicit agreement to sexual activity is seen as discor-
dant, disruptive, and undesirable, and it is widely assumed that anyone can
always ‘‘just say ‘No’,’’ as if that were the end of the matter. Collectively
these views underscore the link between thought and speech, cognition and
rhetoric, and the stubborn tenacity of ‘‘folk-ways.’’24 Despite those views,
sometimes stridently expressed, sexual assaults by nonstrangers, including
spouses, partners, family members, and acquaintances, remain not only the
most common type of sexual assault but also the least likely to be reported and
prosecuted. Either few complainants are saying anything, let alone ‘‘No,’’ or
they are not being heard.Meanwhile, sexual assault remains a serious problem.
‘‘Seduction,’’ rather than ‘‘voluntary agreement,’’ is treated as the con-
venient, though ill-defined, archetype for so-called ‘‘normal’’ sexual behav-
ior.25 Seduction has long been the common stock of the romance novel
and appears central to the manner in which many Canadians view sexual
encounters. One leading legal commentator regrets that developments in
interpretation of sexual assault laws leave no place for what he describes as
‘‘border-line cases’’ involving the nonconsensual sexual touching and
ambiguous communication commonly referred to as ‘‘sexual seduction.’’26
His perception about the law ‘‘on the books’’ as interpreted by the Supreme
Court of Canada is entirely correct. Nonconsensual sexual touching is
sexual assault; such behavior renders the aggressor liable to be convicted
even if the touching is accompanied by ambiguous communication about
consent. But it is also clear that interpretation and application of the law
‘‘on the ground,’’ at the grass roots, and in many of the lower courts, have
not caught up with the law enacted by Parliament and interpreted by the
Supreme Court of Canada. Examination of the case law and patterns of
23. This reaction is arguably symptomatic of what is profoundly problematic about the
concept of so-called ‘‘normal’’ sexual behavior.
24. J.C. MARSH, A. GEIST, & N. CAPLAN, RAPE AND THE LIMITS OF LAW REFORM
107 (1982) (alluding to Summer’s assertion that ‘‘Stateways cannot change Folkways.’’).
25. Wendy Larcombe examined rape narratives and concluded that the ideal of romantic
love depicted in fiction likely has a firm grasp on the cultural imagination and the fantasies
of legions of loyal readers, precisely because it is a foil for the everyday social facts of het-
erosexual exchange; WENDY LARCOMBE, COMPELLING ENGAGEMENTS: FEMINISM, RAPE
LAW AND ROMANCE FICTION 139 (2005). Its appeal is as an escape from ‘‘normal’’ as
experienced by the typical female reader, who knows the difference between fantasy and fact
all too well.
26. Stuart, supra note 21, at 39.
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reporting and enforcement confirms that ‘‘seduction’’ remains an influen-
tial paradigm. It retains a central place in public and professional legal
consciousness, and shapes both sexual conduct and legal decisions in cases
involving sexual activity between persons who knew one another—non-
strangers.27 Part of its popular appeal appears to be its convenient ambi-
guity. Based on the available evidence, there can be little question but that
the dynamics of ‘‘seduction,’’ and common beliefs and attitudes toward it,
do often play a role in decisions not to report or prosecute sexual assaults.
At this point we have established that: (1) ‘‘seduction’’ is used by many
Canadians as an interpretative framework for thinking and talking about
sexual activity, and continues to be the subject of favorable comment in
Canadian legal literature; (2) most sexual assaults in Canada involve ac-
quaintances and family members, i.e., nonstrangers; (3) the vast majority of
sexual assaults by nonstrangers are never reported to police; and (4) com-
paratively few such complaints lead to convictions. Less clear, as yet, is
whether and how these phenomena are related to one another. The concept
of ‘‘seduction’’ is used in ordinary everyday discourse to describe the
dynamics of social encounters and, on occasion, to express social approval,
acceptance, or in some circumstances, condemnation. Beliefs about seduc-
tion, and attitudes toward those who engage in it or are affected by it, are
openly acknowledged as influences in some decisions about whether and
when it is appropriate to invoke a criminal law response to assaultive sexual
conduct. The ease with which sexual assault is interpreted as ‘‘seduction’’
may indeed explain much under-reporting and nonenforcement. But
before we can hope to understand how, by what mechanisms characterizing
or describing behavior as ‘‘seductive’’ affects social judgments and legal deci-
sions, we need to clarify what is ordinarily meant by the term ‘‘seduction.’’28
27. See Melanie Randall, Sexual Assault Law, Credibility, and ‘Ideal Victims’: Consent,
Resistance, and Victim Blaming, 22 CAN. J. WOMAN & L. 397 (2010) [hereinafter, Randall,
Credibility]; Jessica Derynck, Lacking Context, Lacking Change: A Close Look at Five Recent
Lower Court Sexual Assault Decisions, 14 APPEAL: REV. CURRENT L. & LEGAL REFORM 108
(2009) [hereinafter, Derynck, Lacking Change]; Elaine Craig, Ten Years After Ewanchuk the
Art of Seduction is Alive and Well: An Examination of the Mistaken Belief in Consent Defence,
CAN. CRIM. L. REV. 247 (2009) [hereinafter, Craig, Ten Years]; Melanie Randall, Sexual
Assault in Spousal Relationships, Continuous Consent, and the Law: Honest But Mistaken
Judicial Beliefs, 32:1 MANITOBA L.J. 144 (2008) [hereinafter, Randall, Spousal Assault].
28. The following discussion of the term ‘‘seduction’’ is based on the author’s experience as
a participant-observer in Western culture and her analysis of the common usage of the term.
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D. Seduction
‘‘Seduction’’ is commonly used to refer to the process of inducing or
enticing someone to do or agree to do something that, but for the seduc-
tion, she or he would not or might not do. By definition, seduction is not
coercion or compulsion. Seduction uses positive reinforcement, the offer-
ing of something that is desired, to persuade; duress, coercion, or compul-
sion uses negative reinforcement, the threat of something that is feared, to
persuade. In both seduction and duress, however, the subject or target
exercises ‘‘free will’’ and makes a ‘‘choice’’ that is not dictated by the cir-
cumstances. In seduction, the premise is that the subject could have refused
to ‘‘give in to temptation or desire.’’ In duress, the subject could have
‘‘confronted his or her fear’’ and refused to comply with the demand. Thus
in both cases, the action taken by the subject is described as ‘‘a choice’’ and
attributed to the subject, who retains full agency and is taken to be responsible
for the choice she or he made.
In seduction, the choice made by a seducee may or may not be one
a prudent rational person might make in the whole of the circumstances. In
addition, the activity may or may not be something one or both parties
‘‘should not’’ do because of either conflicting commitments or social mores.
The term is used in a wide variety of contexts in which persuasion often has
a role, from sex to politics, business to advertising. Furthermore, the term
often has a subtle quasi-sexual connotation because seduction in any con-
text is understood to play on the subject’s ‘‘desire’’ for ‘‘pleasure,’’ and at
least in the present time, ‘‘pleasure’’ itself has a sexual connotation. The
term may also be used, however, to characterize a nonsexual interaction as
one in which persuasion by inducements ‘‘causes’’ the seducee to want to
do something she or he would otherwise not do. Seduction, as such, does
not necessarily involve physical contact. Words alone may suffice.
In a sexual context, ‘‘seduction’’ refers to: (1) the emotional, psycholog-
ical, cognitive, and psycho-sexual effects of social interaction between two
persons who are attracted to one another and who, through the seduction
process, move from being acquaintances toward a more intense, often
intimate, sexual relationship; (2) the conscious purposeful use of charm,
flattery, gifts, blandishments, and attention to persuade or cajole (or, when
viewed more negatively, manipulate and deceive) another person to look
favorably on you, be attentive to you, spend time with you, and do what
you ask them to do, including engaging in, or at minimum tolerating,
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sexual activity with you; or (3) the effect of one person’s charm, attractive-
ness, charisma, intelligence, prowess, and the like, on another person, even
though one or both parties are or may be partially or entirely unconscious
of those effects. Seduction and seductive conduct may be evaluated either
positively or negatively and described in terms that mirror that judgment.
Whether a seduction is deemed worthy of social approval or disapproval
generally depends on social judgments about: (1) the aggressor/initiator’s
intentions, purposes, or objectives; 2) the net effect of the seduction on the
well-being of the target/mark/seducee; or (3) both of these factors. A sexual
seduction, of any of the three types above—mutual, manipulative, or de
facto and ad hoc—may or may not end well, in a scenario in which
‘‘everyone lives happily ever after.’’ Judged in hindsight in a case where it
produces a good outcome, seduction is seen as a process that secured
spiritual as well as psychological, physical, and social benefits to both
parties. Here sexual attraction is seen as a positive force leading to a positive
outcome—a true union of minds or souls, one might say. Any acts of
manipulation or deception that were used in the course of the seduction
are then retrospectively deemed to be benign, rather than malevolent, or
are simply forgotten because the outcome is assessed positively.
A relationship that originates in a mutual seduction may lose vitality
over time and or cease to be mutual, potentially leaving one or both parties
bereft. Seduction is commonly viewed in a negative light if deceit and
manipulation are used by one party to control the other party for ulterior
purposes, to gain benefits that are not reciprocal, or if the other party
suffers negative or harmful consequences. Literature and mythology are
full of characters, famous and infamous for their seductive exploits, who
exemplify the traits of good will, loyal service, and nurturing beneficence
on the one hand, or deceit, theft, and exploitation on the other. Their
‘‘mark,’’ ‘‘victim,’’ ‘‘soul mate,’’ or ‘‘dearly beloved,’’ as the case may be, are
also often typecast, stock figures—the nature and extent of their net spir-
itual and material gains or losses being largely a function of the socio-
economic arrangements and ideals of the day. Contemporary social cir-
cumstances are different from those of the nineteenth century or of classical
Greece and Rome, but the characterizations of individuals in terms of their
presumed intention and motive, and the impact their actions have on
others, remain quite similar. Seduction remains one of the principal
psycho-social mechanisms that give rise to the interpersonal entanglements
and internal psychological conflicts between reason, emotion, and instinct
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that perennially characterize comedy and tragedy. Tales of seduction mirror
common human hopes and fears, temptations and conflicts.
In many sexual encounters, seduction is used to deflect responsibility for
one party’s sexual choices and sexual activity to the other party. Below, this
characteristic is demonstrated to be of crucial significance in the legal
construction of responsibility in sexual assault cases. In seduction, the
seducee exercises ‘‘free will’’ and makes ‘‘autonomous choices’’ in response
to desire. In a mutual seduction, moreover, each party is both the seducer
and the seducee. Each party explains his/her response to, or infatuation
with, the other person, by pointing to the endearing or inflaming char-
acteristics of the other and then using the language of cause and effect to
explain his or her own choices made in response. This is especially useful
when attempting to explain choices that were arguably imprudent. Desire
for the other is experienced as ‘‘caused by’’ the other and commonly
presumed to be mutual—sometimes wistfully, with fond hope, rather than
accurately; but often each party assumes him- or herself to be the ‘‘cause’’ of
what is presumed to be the other party’s desire. This is a trap. Those who
touch first and ask later, if at all, may sincerely believe he or she is acting
precisely as the other party wishes them to act because the one who initiates
the touching assumes/believes the desire he or she feels is mutual. This is
the tale many sexual offenders tell. Some offenders say they were doing the
complainant a ‘‘favor’’ by doing exactly what the offender ‘‘knew’’ the
complainant wanted/needed the offender to do.29
The concept of ‘‘seduction’’ serves a rich variety of social and legal
functions in large part precisely because of its inherent imprecision and
ambiguity. Once the bare possibility of mutuality is raised, it is easily
surmised that each party may have enticed and persuaded the other. Typ-
ically, both parties will be assumed to have used some sort of enticement or
inducement to influence the other party. Exactly who is the initiator-
aggressor and who is the mark or target quickly becomes quite unclear,
and the question of who touched whom first without consent is lost from
view. Few such cases proceed. Assailants who are perceived as well-
29. Anecdotal evidence. See also LORENNE CLARK & DEBRA LEWIS, RAPE: THE PRICE
OF COERCIVE SEXUALITY 95–108 (1977), wherein they reported that the assailants they
studied exhibited behavior and attitudes that ranged from brutal violence, to callous
indifference, to attempts to normalize the behavior as sex with a ‘‘new love’’ whom he had
successfully ‘‘seduced.’’ In cases of the latter type, the assailant sometimes even sends the
complainant flowers.
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meaning, not intending to cause harm to the other, not ‘‘dangerous,’’ are
those who are most apt to avoid the stigma of being labeled a sex offender.
Here issues of social position, status, and group membership can be crucial.
When a decision maker sees his or her own characteristics and experiences
mirrored in the characteristics, situation, and conduct of the alleged
offender, and says ‘‘That could be me,’’ the likelihood increases that the
accused’s intention and motive will be assessed as either positive or neutral,
and the allegation will be deemed unfounded or the case will be closed
without prosecution. When the conduct either is or is seen to be ambig-
uous with respect to intention or motive, demographic markers become
especially important. When intention or motive appear ambiguous, a deci-
sion maker more easily rationalizes a decision not to proceed, despite a solid
case on the whole of the evidence, by concluding that if the case went to
trial, the trier of fact would be unlikely to believe that the accused—
a member of such and such a family, profession, church, social group, and
so forth—could and would have committed the alleged offense or indeed
any sexual offense.
This dynamic can be seen in the reasons for decision in cases decided at
common law in which liability to conviction was explicitly based on a con-
clusion about the moral quality of the actor rather than the legality of the
act. Accused who were seen to have acted contrary to law but without
a venal intent or motive were often acquitted. This approach continues to
be used in cases involving nonstrangers to distinguish between sexual
activity that involves misadventure and poor judgment, and sexual activity
that is sexual assault. The legal requirement that sexual activity be consen-
sual is often disregarded in such cases. Discourse analysis of reasons for
decision on verdicts and sentencing at trial confirms that negative or pos-
itive appraisals of the accused’s intention and motives and the negative or
positive evaluative connotations of words selected to describe the factual
circumstances of a case tend to mirror one another.30 A decision maker’s
30. Linda Coates & Allan Wade, Telling It Like It Isn’t: Obscuring Perpetrator Respon-
sibility for Violent Crime, 15:5 DISCOURSE & SOC’Y 499 (2004); Greg Matoesian, Re-
presenting Rape: Language and Sexual Consent (Book Review), 14:2 DISCOURSE & SOC’Y 230
(2003); Susan Ehrlich, Discourse, Gender and Sexual Violence, 13:1 DISCOURSE & SOC’Y 5
(2002); Susan Ehrlich, Legal Institutions, Nonspeaking Recipiency and Participants’ Or-
ientations, 13:6 DISCOURSE & SOC’Y 731 (2002); Susan Ehrlich, Law and the Language of
Identity: Discourse in the William Kennedy Smith Rape Trial, 16:1 DISCOURSE & SOC’Y 140
(2005); Susan Ehrlich, Legal Discourse and the Cultural Intelligibility of Gendered Meanings,
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neutral or positive assessment of the ‘‘moral’’ quality of an accused and his
conduct can result in acquittal even though the legal significance of the
facts in evidence at trial points to conviction. Thus nonlegal notions about
the ‘‘morality’’ of socio-sexual activity continue to be potent influences in
decision making in sexual assault cases. Police, prosecutors, and judges are
all exposed to the beliefs, attitudes, and assumptions that are prevalent in
the culture, and this is reflected in the decisions they make.31
A closely related source of ambiguity and uncertainty about what is and
is not sexual assault that works in tandem with, and supports rationales
associated with, the seduction model arises from the present treatment of
the validity of consent obtained by deception. In 1998, in R. v. Cuerrier,
a case in which the accused failed to disclose his positive HIV status, the
Supreme Court of Canada held that the use of deception to induce some-
one to consent to sexual activity only vitiates consent if (1) the deception or
fraudulent representation has ‘‘the effect of exposing the person consenting
to a significant risk of serious bodily harm,’’ and (2) the person would not
have consented had they not been deceived about the issue in question.32
A dissenting view was that any deception that induces the complainant to
consent vitiates consent.33 This could include misrepresentations about
promised gifts (fur coats and diamonds, for example) or the accused’s
employment or profession (‘‘I am a physician, banker, engineer, chairman
of the XYZ board, celebrity, rock star, . . .’’), or marital status. There is
apprehension, however, that the latter approach would tend to trivialize the
criminal law by converting ‘‘ordinary’’ exaggeration and self-
aggrandizement, deception and lies, into crimes. Laws criminalizing seduc-
tion by fraudulent promises of marriage were repealed many years ago in
11:4 J. SOCIOLINGUISTICS 452 (2007); Clare MacMartin, (Un)reasonable Doubt? The
Invocation of Children’s Consent in Sexual Abuse Trial Judgments, 13:1DISCOURSE & SOC’Y 9
(2002); J. Luchjenbroers & M. Aldridge, Conceptual Manipulation by Metaphors and
Frames: Dealing with Rape Victims in Legal Discourse, 27:3 TEXT & TALK 339 (2007). See also
Eades, infra note 106.
31. Some contemporary Canadian legal academics and jurists routinely invoke ‘‘moral-
ity’’ rather than ‘‘legality’’ for persuasive purposes when discussing the interpretation and
application of sexual assault law and criminal law in general. This practice merits sustained
examination and critique; left unchallenged, it may tend to perpetuate traditional as-
sumptions about gender roles, female sexuality, race and social position, and lead to dis-
criminatory enforcement of the law.
32. R. v. Cuerrier, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 371 per Cory J.
33. Id., reasons in dissent by L’Heureux—Dube´ J.
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Canada, and at present there seems to be curiously little appetite among
legal professionals to resurrect such laws in another guise.
The Court’s present interpretation of the law of sexual consent arguably
leads to a contradiction when consent obtained through deception is at
issue, however. The definition of ‘‘sexual consent’’ as ‘‘voluntary agree-
ment’’ suggests that the agreement will be deliberately formed based on
relevant information—that is, that valid consent is ‘‘informed consent.’’ If
so, duplicity with respect to any issue that influenced the decision made by
a particular complainant must vitiate consent, as suggested by the dissent in
Cuerrier. But, to date, the Court has declined to interpret the law of sexual
consent in that manner.34 Cuerrier, discussed above, continues to govern
this issue. As long as deception or fraud does not have the effect of exposing
the complainant to significant risk of serious bodily harm, a complainant
who agrees to sexual activity that she would have refused had she not been
deceived, is deemed to have ‘‘consented.’’ Sexual consent by individuals
who are not incompetent or incapable, but merely trusting or gullible or
tipsy and therefore easily deceived, or who are simply imprudent, is valid
and legally effective.
That approach mirrors and arguably reinforces the widely held under-
standing that seduction, even if it involves some elements of deception, is not
sexual assault because the seducee is a free, though not necessarily prudent,
agent who makes choices about what to do in response to the seducer’s
words and actions. In the absence of proof beyond a reasonable doubt to
the contrary—a high threshold—all sexual activity is ordinarily assumed to
involve some elements of seduction and is therefore presumed to be con-
sensual, the result of the words and conduct of both parties, either of whom
could refuse to participate. These assumptions continue to be used by many
decision makers to distinguish noncriminal sexual activity from sexual
assault. The net effect is that many complainants are found to have ‘‘con-
sented’’—even though the legal significance of the facts viewed through the
lens of the legal definition of ‘‘consent’’ as voluntary agreement would show
that in law they did not. When such complaints are screened by police and
prosecutors using a seduction paradigm, often the result is doubt about the
absence of consent. Doubt about the absence of consent based on the
34. These issues are before the Supreme Court of Canada again in R. v. Mabior, (validity
of consent where accused did not disclose his positive HIV status to the complainants).
Heard February 8, 2012; decision reserved.
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supposition that sexual activity always involves some elements of seduction
results in nonenforcement, even when the legal significance of the material
facts, properly viewed through the lens of the legal definition of ‘‘consent’’
as voluntary agreement, would show either that there was no agreement to
the initial sexual touching or that the agreement was not voluntary. Below
we revisit this phenomenon and examine the influence of the seduction
paradigm on judicial reasoning and judicial practice in those few sexual
assault cases that proceed to trial.
This is not the only category of criminal cases in which traditional
approaches based on social mores, moral judgments, and nonlegal social
assumptions about what constitutes criminality, influence case analysis and
provide a shortcut to the decision. Fraud cases are a leading example. In
1993, the Supreme Court of Canada specifically prohibited the use of
‘‘innocent’’ intent and motive to excuse an accused charged with criminal
fraud.35 Mens rea is established by proving that the accused was aware of
facts indicating that the financial interests of the deceived were put at risk as
a consequence. Culpability turns on the accused’s awareness of the factual
circumstances, not on whether the accused meant well and sincerely
believed that the victim would not actually suffer any loss. Twenty years
later, it remains an open question, however, how often police and pro-
secutors nonetheless continue to rely on their personal opinion about an
accused’s intent and motive to distinguish ‘‘ordinary business practice’’
from ‘‘criminal fraud.’’ Canadian enforcement of white-collar crime
legislation is notoriously weak. As in the enforcement of sexual assault
laws, traditional approaches to analysis of the facts of everyday business
transactions remain tenacious, supported by the social attitudes and
personal beliefs of decision makers. Some police, prosecutors, and trial
judges who exercise legal authority on behalf of the public are reluctant
to apply the criminal law in a manner that condemns actors whose
morals and motives are seen as ‘‘normal,’’ representative of ‘‘ordinary’’
behavior.
Therefore perhaps we should not be quite so surprised to see some legal
professionals and jurists assert that ‘‘sexual seduction’’ involving noncon-
sensual sexual touching should continue to be treated as a form of ‘‘normal
sexual behavior,’’ rather than as sexual assault, or argue that this is necessary
to preclude ‘‘injustice’’ in cases involving sexual activity between young
35. R. v. The´roux, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 579; R. v. Zlatic, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 29.
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people,36 ‘‘intimates,’’37 and spouses.38 Such an approach implicitly draws
a line between strangers and nonstrangers and proposes different standards
for members of each group—‘‘us’’ and those like us, as opposed to the
‘‘others.’’ Criminalization of sexual activity by nonstrangers is viewed as not
only inappropriate but also wholly unnecessary because, it is further
opined, women and girls can and do protect themselves quite adequately
from unwanted sexual overtures by acquaintances and other nonstrangers.
That is a tautology, framed as an assertion of fact, which implies that all
sexual activity between nonstrangers is, by definition, consensual. The
argument typically proceeds more or less along the following lines:
All a woman or girl needs to do is say ‘‘No,’’ and her spouse, friend, or
partner will be able to discern her ‘‘true’’ wishes and desist—as has, of
course, always been the case in ‘‘normal’’ sexual relationships between
‘‘normal’’ people. Kissing and touching in the absence of overt consent is
normal. Anyone who wishes to resist a sexual overture can easily do so. Life
would be diminished, would lose some of its magical zest, if we abandoned
the subtle ‘‘art’’ of seduction. It’s so common and harmless that abandoning
it is really out of the question; in any event, seduction certainly should never
be a ground for criminal liability.
In this fictional opinion piece, nonconsensual physical contact between
friends and spouses is romanticized as ‘‘seduction’’ rather than stigmatized
as an offense. Although it is fictional, the attitudes it depicts are quite real
and very common.
E. Tales of Seduction
Proof of the absence of consent is difficult when a seduction scenario is
available to provide an alternate theory for the case. Seduction scenarios are
commonly used to characterize sexual activity as consensual when the
parties know one another, regardless of the specific basis of the relationship.
Used effectively by an accused or his counsel, the bare fact of a relationship
can be used to suggest seduction and, in turn, consent. A simple intimation
36. As noted by Professor Stuart, for example, supra note 21.
37. Supra note 27 (all sources); and JENNIFER KOSHAN, THE LEGAL TREATMENT OF
MARITAL RAPE AND WOMEN’S EQUALITY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE CANADIAN EXPERIENCE
(equality effect, 2010), http://theequalityeffect.org/pdfs/maritalrapecanadexperience.pdf.
38. See Randall, Credibility, supra note 27; Randall, Spousal Assault, supra note 27; Craig,
Ten Years, supra note 27; and Koshan, supra note 37.
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that seduction may have occurred usually suffices to imply that the activity
may have been consensual. This invites the conclusion that the activity was
not criminal, and the accused is not liable to be convicted. In the absence of
extreme violence, a seduction scenario is usually assumed to be available,
even when evidence of conduct that might be realistically described as
‘‘seductive’’ is scanty. This is widely appreciated by complainants and
assailants alike; it affects both social behavior and the reporting of sexual
offenses committed by nonstrangers in a broad range of social relationships.
The socio-economic circumstances of many types of social relationships
give rise to differences between the status, authority, and power of the
parties that facilitate use of the seduction paradigm to insinuate that the
complainant may have consented. In each category below, such factors are
often used to create doubt about the absence of consent.
Immigrants and refugees. Refugees and persons without immigration
documents are at high risk of sexual exploitation.39 They are often poor,
not fluent in the dominant language, fearful of being deported, and may
work under conditions in which they are subject to the exercise of arbitrary
power by supervisors. Complaints to employers or the police are rare due to
fear of adverse consequences. Language barriers and inadequate resources
for law enforcement and support services impede effective enforcement of
the law. In the unlikely event that a case is reported and selected for
prosecution, the prosecutor must anticipate that the accused will claim
that he ‘‘seduced’’ the complainant, that she chose to engage in the sexual
activity with him in response to her sexual desire for him. Her poverty may
be used to insinuate that she hoped the relationship with the assailant
would result in favorable treatment in the workplace or other benefits. It
may even be suggested that she is a seductress who acted as the aggressor in
initiating the sexual activity in an attempt to improve her circumstances by
creating an allegiance with someone in a position of power and authority in
the work place.40
39. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CULTIVATING FEAR: THE VULNERABILITY OF IMMI-
GRANT FARMWORKERS IN THE U.S. TO SEXUAL VIOLENCE AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT
(May 2012), http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us0512ForUpload_1.pdf.
40. Seduction scenarios demonstrate the fragility of a classical liberal ‘‘consent’’ model
based on the assumption of autonomous choices among equals. There are often disparities
in power or status between the parties that affect the choices the parties make and the
operation of the legal process, but these disparities and their effects are not recognized by the
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Professors and students, coaches and players, clergy and lay persons.
Students, athletes, and parishioners have long been vulnerable to sexual
exploitation by teachers, coaches, and spiritual mentors. In recent years, the
vulnerability of those in subordinate positions within institutional hierar-
chies to assault by teachers, coaches, and religious and community leaders
has come to be better understood. Abuse of trust, power, or authority as
a means to obtain sexual access to those under one’s supervision is now
explicitly recognized in Canada under section 273.1(2)(c) of the Criminal
Code as a circumstance in which consent is not obtained. In theory it
should now be easier to characterize sexual touching by physicians and
teachers, as well as by supervisors within any organizational structure, as
sexual assault rather than successful seduction. In practice, however, as long
as the complainant is not a minor, offenses that fall within this category
remain open to interpretation through a traditional seduction lens, rather
than a legal lens; many of these offenses are likely neither reported or nor
prosecuted.41
Acquaintances, including ‘‘dates.’’ Sexual activity between acquaintances is
unlikely to be reported even when the potential complainant knows that
she did not consent and that she was sexually assaulted. Cases that are
reported but do not involve evidence of serious physical injuries to the
complainant are easily (albeit incorrectly) categorized as noncriminal on the
ground that, at worst, the parties failed to communicate effectively. Re-
phrased, this often simply means that the complainant is told that the assault
was her fault, that she should haveobjectedmore vigorously, etc., etc., and that
the evidence leaves room for reasonable doubt about the absence of consent.42
Members of extended acquaintance, employment, service, or family
networks. A complainant who is not impoverished but who is subordi-
nate to the assailant because of their respective social positions or the
unqualified theoretical model. Legal theorists have been aware of these limitations for many
decades. Judges often ignore them.
41. See, for example, the decision in the preliminary hearing in R. v. RHR, [2007] N.J.
No. 279, Newfoundland and Labrador Provincial Court. The preliminary inquiry judge did
not commit the professor to trial and dismissed the charges. For reasons known only to the
prosecutor, the Crown did not appeal the decision.
42. See R. v. T.A., [2007] N.J. No. 192 (here again, the Crown failed to appeal the
acquittal); R. v. Ewanchuk, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 330, and concerns raised by Stuart, supra note 21.
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terms of her employment is vulnerable to ongoing sexual exploitation
that may be less visible than that to which the most marginalized persons
are subject. Comparative socio-economic stability and an adequate stan-
dard of living may create an appearance of order and of personal and
family security that mask exploitation. In these circumstances, fear of
loss of socio-economic security and stability may be manipulated by an
assailant to secure the complainant’s silence. Assailants may be thor-
oughly socialized to expect sexual compliance, deference, and silence
from those in subordinate social positions, and may be shocked to be
accused of sexual assault.43
Spouses or partners, married or living in a long-term partnership. Analysis
of sexual consent between spouses and long-term sexual partners is often
confusing for both participants and legal professionals. Extensive research
in the Canadian context shows a continuing widespread and persistent
tendency to imply consent on the basis of the fact of marriage or long-
standing intimacy between the parties. In law, of course, consent cannot be
implied, but some jurists and other legal professionals cling to the tradi-
tional but defunct belief that, by definition, marriage or a similar long-term
relationship entails ongoing sexual consent. Distorted legal reasoning
results.44
43. See Indictment No. 2526/2011, People v. Dominique Strauss-Kahn, 2011 WL
3671880, alleging that on May 14, 2011, the accused, then President of the International
Monetary Fund and widely expected to be a candidate in the French presidential cam-
paign, sexually assaulted a hotel housekeeper in his New York City hotel suite. On August
22, 2011, the prosecutor filed a motion for dismissal of the charges; Motion to Dismiss,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2011/08/22/nyregion/dsk-documents-
and-court-filings.html?ref¼dominiquestrausskahn. The complainant’s credibility with
respect her statements about the facts related to the alleged assault by Mr. Strauss-
Kahn was not impugned, but in the prosecutor’s opinion there was reason to believe that
although members of a jury might find her credible—just as the investigators had ini-
tially—she was not a reliable witness; to proceed would be to risk a wrongful conviction,
hence the request for dismissal. Whether the district attorney’s office is always as careful in
its assessment of the reliability of its witnesses is unknown. There has been wide-ranging
speculation about the role the accused’s political aspirations and reputation as an avid
consumer of the services of sex workers may have played in these events and the
aftermath.
44. See R. v. RV, [2001] OJ No. 5143 (Ont Ct J); for discussion and case history, see
infra, note 49.
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F. Seduction Paradigms and Case Analysis in Police Stations and the Courts
When a seduction paradigm is used to analyze a sexual assault case,
the parties’ conduct is normalized and the factors of power and de
facto control highlighted above are rendered apparently insignificant.
Ewanchuk45 illustrates this extremely well. The evidence showed that
the young woman not only did not consent to sexual contact with the
much older, larger, and heavier potential employer but told him to stop
not merely once but three times. Nonetheless, the trial judge and two of
three appeal judges found support in the evidence for the possibility that
Ewanchuk may have interpreted her behavior as consent. The acquittal
was upheld at the first level of appeal, even though on the facts as found
at trial, the defense of belief in consent was unavailable as a matter of
law, pursuant to both statute and common law. The alacrity with which
these three jurists all concluded that the accused may have believed the
complainant consented suggests they recognized that in the same cir-
cumstances they might have also believed she consented. That, of course,
was not the legal question they were required to answer, but this does
explain why these jurists viewed the accused’s conduct as ‘‘normal,’’ not
‘‘criminal.’’
The subsequent unanimous decision by the Supreme Court of Canada,
granting the Crown’s appeal and entering a conviction on the basis of
findings of fact at trial, was viewed with dismay in some circles as a feminist
coup d’e´tat; dire warnings were issued by some journalists and the occa-
sional academic, as noted above, predicting widespread criminalization of
‘‘normal sexual behavior,’’ including ‘‘seduction.’’46 Questions in the
minds of many vocal critics of the Court’s decision appeared to include:
‘‘Aren’t there/ shouldn’t there be some cases in which ‘‘‘No’ does not really
mean ‘No’?’’ ‘‘Are our sex lives changed forever?’’ ‘‘Does this mean we are all
rapists and sex offenders?’’47
45. Ewanchuk, supra note 42.
46. Stuart, supra note 21.
47. See Wright, supra note 21, for detailed analysis of the public controversy that
accompanied the progress of the case through the courts. The debate surrounding Ewan-
chuk as it progressed through the appeal process in the late 1990s suggests it had been widely
assumed that the 1992 amendments (largely codifications of existing common law), would
require few changes in how sexual assault law was actually interpreted and applied in
practice. KENT ROACH, DUE PROCESS AND VICTIMS’ RIGHTS 171–74 (1999), reports that
view was widespread. The subsequent controversy revealed sharply divided views about
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More than a decade later, some judges continue to view the evidence in
sexual assault cases through the lens of the seduction model and conclude
either that ‘‘No’’ didn’t really mean ‘‘No’’ or that even when it clearly did,
the accused may not have realized that consent was absent, didn’t mean to
do anything ‘‘wrong,’’ and should not be convicted.48 On occasion judges
even suggest that if the complainant had acted differently, been more
understanding of her partner’s feelings, and made her wishes more obvious,
there would have been no case to hear.49 This, of course, is the classic
response of ‘‘blaming the victim.’’ The seduction paradigm explains why
some trial judges continue to find it so difficult to interpret and apply the
law of consent and belief in consent correctly in cases involving sexual
activity between individuals who are not strangers.50 The belief that
conviction and criminalization is ordinarily an inappropriate outcome
in a sexual assault case involving nonstrangers easily leads to result-
oriented deliberation that distorts findings of fact and the legal reasoning
process.
It is thus quite clear that the ‘‘‘No’ means ‘No’’’ standard, whether that
slogan is associated with the 1992 amendments51 or with those amend-
ments as interpreted in Ewanchuk,52 has neither criminalized large seg-
ments of the population nor revolutionized sexual behavior in Canada.
Nonconsensual sexual activity between spouses, partners, or acquaintances,
that takes place under circumstances police, prosecutors, and trial judges do
whether the 1992 amendments should be interpreted and applied in a manner that went
beyond those expectations.
48. See Randall, Credibility and Spousal Assault, supra note 27; and Koshan, supra note
37, for multiple examples.
49. R. v. RV, 2001 OJ No. 5143 per Wolder J. (Ct J), illustrates the tendency of some
judges to find the assailee lacked sufficient sensitivity to the accused spouse’s ‘‘romantic’’
impulses. See Christine Boyle, Sexual Assault as Foreplay: Does Ewanchuk Apply to Spouses?,
20 C.R.(6th) 359 (2004), commenting on the decision in R. v. RV, [2004] OJ No. 849 (Ont
Sup Ct J), upholding the trial decision reported at [2001] OJ No. 5143 (Ont Ct J). The
Crown’s further appeal from acquittal was dismissed, [2004] OJ No. 849 (CA); no re-trial
was ordered despite findings of major errors of law in both the lower court decisions.
50. Randall, Spousal Assault, supra note 27, at 147, 179, found some judges assume
consent ‘‘to exist by virtue of the existence of an ongoing intimate relationship,’’ and ‘‘recast
sexual persistence and even intrusion, as indicating ‘romantic’ gestures and intentions on the
part of the accused.’’
51. Roach, supra note 47.
52. Ewanchuk, supra note 42; Stuart, supra note 21, in response to Ewanchuk.
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not consider exploitative in a traditional sense, is still often not seen to be
a ‘‘proper’’ basis for a criminal conviction.53 Case outcomes continue to
depend largely on the attitudes and beliefs of counsel and the trial judge,
not the law.54 Many poorly reasoned judicial decisions likely reflect per-
spectives on the facts of the case that were initially suggested by counsel.55
The personal attitudes of police and prosecutors also influence decisions
about whether charges are laid and cases proceed to trial. Enforcement of
the law is wholly at the discretion of the police and the Crown prosecutor’s
office; prosecutors do not routinely appeal acquittals even when an appeal
is available in law. Resources, workloads, and public priorities all play a part
in these decisions. In rare cases, a judge may enter a stay of prosecution on
the ground of abuse of prosecutorial discretion, but to date, Canadian
judges have not been prepared to direct that a prosecution proceed.56
53. Boyle, supra note 49; Randall, Credibility and Spousal Assault, supra note 27; Craig,
Ten Years, supra note 27; Derynck, Lacking Change, supra note 27. See also the extensive
examination of spousal assault cases in Koshan, supra note 37. Spousal assaults that do not
involve traditional forms of violence and exploitation rarely result in charges or proceed to
the trial stage.
54. Ruthy Lazar interviewed prosecutors and defense counsel in wife/partner rape cases
in Ontario, and found they ‘‘presume consent to sex in intimate relationships, which, in
turn, shapes the way those players construct and litigate wife rape.’’ Ruthy Lazar,Negotiating
Sex: The Legal Construct of Consent in Cases of Wife Rape in Ontario Canada, 22 CAN. J.
WOMEN & L. 329 (2010) at 333. JENNIFER TEMKIN & BARBARA KRAHE´, SEXUAL ASSAULT
AND THE JUSTICE GAP: A QUESTION OF ATTITUDE (2008), report similar outcomes in
their studies of the attitudes and beliefs of legal professionals in the United Kingdom and in
studies by others undertaken in other jurisdictions.
55. To achieve the balanced and independent perspective on the law and the facts
required for sound decision making, judges may need the assistance of counsel for an
intervener in public interest, counsel for the complainant, and a legal reasoning critic
employed by the court to vet and critique draft judgments. All three would bring distinct
perspectives to the proceedings and the deliberation process. Judges need resources and
support of this type in cases in which counsel for both parties, acting in complete good faith
as officers of the Court, unwittingly advocate analyses that misrepresent the law. See
Vandervort, Legal Subversion, supra note 20, at 150–52; and Lucinda Vandervort, Access to
Justice and the Public Interest in the Administration of Justice, 63 U. NEW BRUNSWICK L.J.
125, at 140–41, (2012).
56. Prosecutorial discretion and authority must uphold the fundamental constitutional
principle of rule of law and be exercised in a quasi-judicial manner. This leaves a broad
margin for the exercise of discretion in enforcement of the law. See ROBERT J. FRATER,
PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT (2009).
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G. The Impact of Slogans on Social Expectations and Legal Consciousness
In view of the persistent pattern of nonenforcement, even in cases involving
the clear refusal of consent, it is ironic that the slogan ‘‘‘No’ means ‘No’’’
was so strongly linked in the minds of many with the 1992 amendments to
the sexual assault provisions of the Canadian Criminal Code. Affirmation
of the legal right to refuse sexual activity was a priority for activists in 1992;
the slogan appears to have been adopted and widely used in the belief
that it was a singularly effective means of summarizing a key aspect of
what many activists believed the law, as amended, would require.
Hindsight shows that to characterize the gist of the law in that manner
lends tacit support to the deeply embedded but defunct notion that
there is an onus on complainants to protest, to resist, and to do so in
a manner that is credible.57 That is the irony. Users of the slogan
unwittingly support the application of the seduction paradigm whereby
failure to resist an assault, or resist effectively, functions as ‘‘consent’’;
the slogan masquerades as progressive advocacy while covertly perpet-
uating traditional mores.
The widespread popularity of the slogan is likely attributable, in part, to
the fact that it is so innocuous on its face.Of course ‘‘‘No’ means ‘No’!’’ The
slogan states the obvious and thereby merely affirms what ‘‘right-thinking’’
people do not dispute.58 The slogan could therefore be used to garner
broad support for the 1992 amendments on the assumption that the only
individuals who would be caught out on the wrong side of such a propo-
sition are ‘‘sexual deviants’’ and ‘‘true rapists’’—‘‘others,’’ not ‘‘us.’’ Strongly
held, that assumption has socially discriminatory effects; the sexual assault
laws are more often and more easily enforced in cases involving accused
57. See R. v. Ewanchuk, [1998] AJ No. 150 (ABCA) at {{ 58–59, in which Fraser CJC,
writing in dissent, notes ‘‘the apparent unwillingness by some to let go of the debunked
notion that unless a complainant physically resisted or expressed verbal opposition to sexual
activity, an accused was entitled to assume that consent existed.’’
58. Kent Roach reports that in 1992, the criminal defense bar did not object to codifi-
cation of a requirement that an accused take steps to ascertain consent that were reasonable
in the circumstances known to him; see Criminal Code, s.273.2(b). Roach reports that
‘‘defence lawyers did not object because they were confident that ‘judges and juries impose
their own inherent objective standards’ (Canada, JLAC, 21 June 1992, 5:12–13)’’; Roach, supra
note 47, at 174. Defense lawyers were clearly correct; see Lucinda Vandervort, ‘‘Too Young to
Sell Me Sex!?’’ Mens Rea, Mistake of Fact, Reckless Exploitation, and the Underage Sex Worker,
58 CRIM. L.Q. 330 (2012).
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who are seen as ‘‘other’’ and whose sexual and interpersonal relationships
are presumed to be different from ‘‘ours.’’ In cases involving spouses and
intimates, this same assumption encourages decision makers to conclude
that enforcement of the sexual assault laws is inappropriate or improper
even when, as a matter of law, the sexual activity is sexual assault. Such
reliance on extra-legal criteria and personal norms is common, effectively
privatizes the exercise of judicial discretion, and commonly leads to legal
errors. Empirical research and anecdotal evidence shows that this same
phenomenon affects both police work and prosecutorial decision making
in many jurisdictions.59
Decisions show that two decades after enactment of the 1992 amend-
ments, traditional views about ‘‘normal sexual behavior’’ are still influential
and continue to place an onus on the complainant to object to unwanted
sexual touching. When a decision maker, whether policeman, prosecutor,
or judge, believes gratuitous nonconsensual sexual touching is a ‘‘normal’’
form of interaction—and therefore must surely be prima facie ‘‘lawful,’’ as
the reasoning goes—often little or no attention is directed to whether the
complainant affirmatively consented, communicated voluntary agree-
ment, or said ‘‘Yes’’ and did so voluntarily. Similarly, when it is alleged
that affirmative consent was communicated but was not voluntary, a deci-
sion maker who views and interprets the facts through a traditional seduc-
tion lens and mentality is unlikely to find consent to be vitiated and
invalid in the absence of evidence of overt exploitation such as black-
mail, extreme violence, or threats of violence. Surprisingly, even in cases
where extreme violence or blackmail is used to coerce cooperation, an
appeal by the Crown may be required before a conviction is entered.60
When evidence of overt exploitation is not present, assaults are often not
reported and rarely lead to charges, proceed to trial, or result in a reported
59. Refer again to the sources offered supra in note 6, as well as the sources and com-
mentary supra in note 43.
60. See R. v. MacFie (BS), [2001] 277 AR 86 (CA), reasons per McFadyen JA [MacFie];
and R. v. Stender, (sub nom R. v. S (DG)), [2004] 190 OAC 127, aff’d [2005] 1 S.C.R. 914.
In each case, a panel of three Court of Appeal judges allowed the Crown’s appeal from the
acquittal at trial and entered a conviction on the basis of the findings of fact at trial. See
Lucinda Vandervort, Honest Beliefs, Credible Lies, and Culpable Awareness: Rhetoric,
Inequality, and Mens Rea in Sexual Assault, 42:4OSGOODE HALL L.J. 625, at 629–32 (2005),
for analysis of MacFie.
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decision.61 In short, the ‘‘seduction’’ model is not only far from extinct,
but thriving, while the sexual assault laws are seldom enforced.
In Canada, the cause of these phenomena is not the substantive law.
Nonenforcement of the sexual assault laws occurs because as a society we
choose nonenforcement, just as large numbers of us choose to commit sexual
assault. The attitudes and beliefs of ordinary Canadians, police, prosecu-
tors, and judges determine how decisions about sexual activity are made,
whether offenses are reported, and how allegations are handled by the
criminal justice system.62 The sexual assault laws, as such, are well designed
and, when properly interpreted with guidance from common law and
constitutional principles, are fully adequate to protect the personal sexual
integrity of persons in Canada. The problem arises from the commission of
a large number of sexual assaults combined with low and extremely selec-
tive reporting and enforcement of the sexual assault laws. This was the basic
problem twenty-five years ago and remains so now. Yet judges and other
professionals working in the criminal justice system can easily acquire
a good working knowledge of sexual assault law, and some clearly do.
The present widespread failure either to comply with or to enforce the
sexual assault laws is therefore reason for dismay. The gap between the
‘‘legal definitions’’ and ‘‘social definitions’’ of consent and sexual assault was
identified twenty-five years ago as a key impediment to correct interpreta-
tion and effective enforcement of the sexual assault laws.63 Shortly there-
after the function of mistakes of law in legal reasoning in sexual assault cases
was analyzed, and it was argued that the criminal responsibility of accused
in sexual assault cases is subject to the same general principle that applies to
accused generally: that ignorance of the law affords an accused no excuse.
Mistaken beliefs about the law of consent or the legal significance of facts of
which the accused was aware do not negative mens rea.64 Arguments based
on law and policy were developed to demonstrate that within an egalitarian
political and constitutional framework, sexual consent at common law
61. Few alleged sexual assaults lead to a contested trial and verdict with reasons for
decision. Some of the charges laid are disposed of by a guilty plea and plea bargain. See the
sources offered supra in notes 3, 5, and 6, and the discussion in notes 3 and 5.
62. Refer again to the sources offered supra in note 6, and to the sources and commentary
supra in note 54.
63. Lucinda Vandervort, Enforcing the Sexual Assault Laws: An Agenda for Action, 3:4
RESOURCES FOR FEMINIST RES. 44 (1985).
64. See Vandervort, Mistake of Law, supra note 1.
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requires affirmative consent, the actual communication of voluntary agree-
ment.65 By 1999, all those propositions had been affirmed by Parliament
and the Supreme Court.66 In particular, in Ewanchuk, the Supreme Court
affirmed much of the jurisprudence on consent developed in M (M.L.),67
Park,68 and Esau,69 construed the 1992 amendments (which codified the
definition of consent and the bars that curtail reliance on the defense of
belief in consent), and reversed the decision on the ground that, like the
accused, two of the three justices presiding in the Court of Appeal were
mistaken in their interpretation of the law of consent.70
After the decision in Ewanchuk, some observers anticipated that enforce-
ment patterns would gradually change to reflect the law, yet empirical
studies show that enforcement patterns do not appear to have changed
significantly. Anecdotal evidence points to the same conclusion. The lack
of significant change in the types and proportion of offenses actually re-
ported and prosecuted appears to result from the continuing influence of
nonlegal factors—cultural paradigms, and narratives, assumptions, atti-
tudes, and beliefs about ‘‘normal’’ sexual activity—on the decisions made
by complainants, police, prosecutors, trial judges, and jurors.71 Part II
identifies the practices that continue to permit nonlegal factors to influence
legal decisions about sexual consent, and proposes a solution.
II. SOLUTIONS
A. The Way Forward: A Different Cultural Paradigm or the Rule of Law?
The process of mapping legal criteria onto the facts of a case is crucial for
decision making. At present, the outcome in the typical sexual assault case
is largely determined by the interpretative paradigm used to make sense of
65. Id.
66. See Criminal Code, supra note 8; and Vandervort, supra note 8.
67. R. v. M. (M.L.), [1994] 2 S.C.R. 3.
68. R. v. Park, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 836.
69. R. v. Esau, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 777.
70. R. v. Ewanchuk, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 330.
71. Canadian decision makers continue to rely heavily on ‘‘common sense,’’ not law. The
working assumption appears to be: ‘‘reasonable people don’t need a lot of guidance by legal
rules and procedures.’’ This attitude is apparent in the handling of sexual assault cases
throughout the criminal justice system. The combination of ‘‘common sense’’ and
‘‘morality’’ threatens to take us back, way, way back, to the future.
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the facts in social and cultural terms, rather than by law and legal criteria,
because the paradigm often dominates the mapping process used to analyze
the evidence.72 The mapping process includes selection of the legal ques-
tions to be asked, identification of the material facts, and determination of
the order in which legal questions are asked and answered. If a cultural
paradigm is permitted to shape the process of mapping legal rules and
criteria onto the facts, the paradigm used to make sense of a case as
a narrative or story determines the outcome.73 This leads to decisions made
in the absence of thorough legal analysis, as the paradigm and the mapping
process it suggests provide a shortcut to the conclusion. The result is rule by
cultural norms, not by law.74 If the objective is to bring the rule of the law to
the interpretation of sexual consent, the reasoning process must be structured
to ensure that essential legal questions are asked and answered. The process
used to map the law onto the facts must accurately and reliably: (1) identify
the material facts and select, interpret, and apply legal rules to those facts; (2)
preclude overt or covert reliance on nonlegal norms and definitions; and (3)
affirm relevant principles, values, and objectives, including the principle of
sexual self-determination.75 This requires a different approach to the map-
ping problem from the one commonly used in sexual assault cases, which
permits cultural narratives, stock stories, and nonlegal norms, such as those
embedded in the seduction paradigm, to influence interpretation.
At present, the seduction paradigm has a central place in professional
and public legal consciousness. It influences our conceptualization of sexual
consent and our beliefs about how sexual consent and refusal are commu-
nicated. Individual sexual conduct both reflects and reinforces entrenched
72. From Jerome Frank to the present, a rich literature documents and analyzes the use
and abuse of story telling and narrative, hunch and intuition in legal decision making.
73. For another example of this phenomenon at work in a related context where as-
sumptions about gender and sexual roles were crucial, see Lisa Sarmas, Storytelling and the
Law: A Case Study of Louth v Diprose, 19 MELB. U. L. REV. 701 (1993–1994). Chameleon-
like, the ‘‘facts’’ of Louth v. Diprose can be selectively highlighted and construed to suggest
either unjust enrichment or harassment and stalking, depending on the narrative selected.
74. Trial counsel are familiar with these tools.
75. These may be common law principles or those used to frame the legislation. The
Preamble to Bill C-49 refers to ss. 7 and 15 of the Canadian Charter Of Rights and Freedoms,
Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982,
c.11, thereby invoking the principles of equality and fundamental justice as a justification
and framework for attainment of the stated legislative objectives of the 1992 amendments;
see Bill C-49, supra note 10; and Vandervort, supra note 8.
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‘‘folk-ways’’ and social expectations that normalize sexual assault. Sexual
conduct is therefore unlikely to change unless the sexual assault laws are
vigorously enforced or those mutually reinforcing social and cultural ele-
ments are replaced by widespread adoption of an alternative cultural par-
adigm and different behavioral norms. To thrive and become entrenched
in public and professional consciousness, any new paradigm would need to
serve mutually reinforcing social, cultural, and psychological functions, just
as the elements of the old paradigm do.
It may be tempting to believe that a new cultural paradigm76 designed to
support the definition of ‘‘consent’’ as voluntary agreement would trans-
form cultural assumptions, beliefs, and attitudes toward sexual behavior,
vastly reduce the incidence of sexual assault, encourage reporting, and alter
the decision-making processes in sexual assault cases. But reliance on that
option might require extreme patience and resignation; change in gender
norms could prove to be exceedingly slow.
Another option is to set cultural paradigms firmly to the side—as a sub-
versive distraction in a diverse and multicultural society where traditions
and sexual tastes and practices differ—and focus on renovating the pro-
cesses commonly used in legal analysis to secure implementation of legal
norms, the rule of law. The law purports to protect sexual self-
determination for all individuals. Why not use the rule of law to implement
that objective more effectively, and leave cultural tastes and civil society to
evolve as they may . . . or may not?77 The two options can be pursued in
76. An alternate paradigm would include a conceptualization of sexual consent that is
correct in law, a shared understanding of how sexual consent and refusal are communicated,
and a new behavioral model for the initiation and conduct of sexual relationships that
applies in all contexts, including those in which nonstrangers, acquaintances, family
members, and intimates interact. Writers could create a new vocabulary of erotic images and
perhaps reclaim and transform the working meaning of ‘‘seduction’’ by telling stories about
gratuitous nonconsensual ‘‘groping’’ in terms that reveal its often foolish reality. Such stories
could help assailees to hold their experience of assault at a psychological and emotional arm’s
length as the assailant’s project, not one the assailee ‘‘caused’’ by enticement. The powerful
cognitive, emotional, and social dynamics of seduction and its variations, explored above,
provide a partial explanation of the current low rates of reporting for nonstranger assaults
and a basis for understanding and responding to ‘‘victim blaming’’ and ‘‘internalization of
responsibility’’ for assault by assailees. The latter are discussed, with reference to the psy-
chological literature, by Randall in Credibility, supra note 27, at 415–33.
77. Those who try to use state authority to curtail violence and exploitation linked with
traditional gender roles should have no illusions, however. Vulnerable people often avoid
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tandem, but this article focuses on identifying the analytic steps and judi-
cial practices required to ensure that legal reasoning in sexual assault cases is
based on legal norms and definitions, not on the seduction paradigm and
the beliefs, attitudes, and assumptions that paradigm supports.
B. The Impact of Paradigms in Legal Analysis and Judicial Practice
Analysis of individual cases provides evidence of how paradigms and stock
stories affect legal analysis. Nonstranger assaults are an especially fruitful
subject of analysis precisely because these assaults, though common, are
rarely reported or successfully prosecuted. It is quite apparent from schol-
arly analysis of reported cases, cited above in Part I, that cultural norms, not
legal norms, dominate in the ‘‘regulation’’ of sexual assault. Nonstranger
sexual assaults provide useful evidence of the subversive operation and
impact of cultural paradigms in legal decision making. This also has im-
plications for cases in which the assailant is a stranger or is viewed as
‘‘other.’’ When an assailant is not a stranger, not ‘‘other,’’ and is assumed
to have engaged in so-called ‘‘normal’’ sexual behavior, the assumption is
easily made that the complainant may well have agreed voluntarily. This
invites perverse acquittals. At the same time, stranger assailants are disad-
vantaged by cultural paradigms that invite decision makers to assume the
complainant did not voluntarily agree to sexual activity. This increases the
risk of wrongful convictions. The ‘‘us’’/‘‘them’’, ‘‘acquaintance’’ or ‘‘inti-
mate’’/‘‘other’’ dichotomy facilitates both forms of discrimination. A more
relying on state agencies for protection because those agencies have proven to be ineffective.
In contemporary North America, battered and abused women and girls, like undocumented
refugees or the slaves of previous eras, often recognize that flight or going underground are
their best options. The enactment of a substantive law is never anything more than a first
step, and laws are not self-executing. The observation that the rule of law is subject to
subversion by deeply embedded cultural attitudes and beliefs is hardly novel. See JAMES C.
SCOTT, for example, on the myriad of means by which state attempts to alter ‘‘folk-ways’’
have long been subverted: DOMINATION AND THE ARTS OF RESISTANCE (1990); SEEING
LIKE A STATE: HOW CERTAIN SCHEMES TO IMPROVE THE HUMAN CONDITION HAVE
FAILED (1998); and THE ART OF NOT BEING GOVERNED: AN ANARCHIST HISTORY OF
UPLAND SOUTHEAST ASIA (2009). In addition, legal institutions are sometimes designed to
accommodate and facilitate rather than curtail the expression of local cultural influences,
including behavioral norms. That approach is used in Canada. Canadian federalism dele-
gates authority with respect to selected subject matters, including the enforcement of the
criminal laws, to the provinces. Such arrangements facilitate the diffusion of governmental
responsibility and accountability. See Vandervort, Legal Subversion, supra note 20, passim.
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rigorous, thorough, and reliable approach to analysis of consent in the actus
reus of sexual assault is clearly needed.
Vulnerable groups. The individuals who are most vulnerable to noncon-
sensual sexual touching, that is, sexual assault, include those who are (1)
children, (2) asleep or unconscious, (3) physically, cognitively, or emotion-
ally disabled, or (4) disempowered in relation to the assailant as a conse-
quence of socio-economic relationships and conditions. Sexual activity
with children78 and people who are asleep or unconscious79 is nonconsen-
sual as a matter of law in Canada. Individuals who are disabled are often in
a socio-economically dependent position and may be compliant as a result
of socialization or institutionalization. Those who are cognitively or emo-
tionally disabled may not have the legal capacity to agree voluntarily to
sexual activity in any event. Janine Benedet and Isabel Grant have written
at length about the issues arising under Canadian law in sexual assault cases
involving complainants with disabilities.80 In recent work, they explore the
impact of situation-specific variables on a complainant’s ability to appre-
ciate and agree to sexual activity. Some complainants may have capacity to
refuse sexual activity in certain circumstances but lack capacity to under-
stand and voluntarily agree (affirmatively consent) because agreement en-
tails more complex perceptual and cognitive processes.81
The fourth group—persons who are disempowered in relation to the
assailant due to socio-economic relationships and circumstances—poses
analytic challenges. In particular, the distinction between legitimate and
78. In Canada the age of sexual consent was raised from 14 to 16 years of age in 2008. See
Criminal Code, s.150.1. RSC 1985, c.19 (3rd Suppl), s.1; 2005, c.32, s.2; 2008, c.6, ss.13, 54.
79. ‘‘Prior consent’’ is a legally ineffective form of sexual consent. Sexual consent is
ongoing and may be withdrawn at any time; persons who are unconscious lack the capacity
to withdraw consent. For details, see Vandervort, Affirmative Consent, supra note 8, at 401
n.6 & 424–25. But see Don Stuart, J.A.: Asserting Dogma over Reality, 84 C.R. (6th) 38
(2011) (alleging that the reasons for judgment by McLachlin CJC for the majority in J.A.
constitute a ‘‘dogmatic’’ adherence to the rule of law).
80. Janine Benedet & Isabel Grant,Hearing the Sexual Assault Complaints of Women with
Mental Disabilities: Consent, Capacity, and Mistaken Belief, 52 MCGILL L.J. 243 (2007); and
Hearing the Sexual Assault Complaints of Women with Mental Disabilities: Evidentiary and
Procedural Issues, 52 MCGILL L.J. 515 (2007).
81. Janine Benedet, The Sexual Assault of Intoxicated Women, 22:2 CAN. J. WOMEN & L.
435, 459–60 (2010), citing R. v. Stender (sub nom R. v. S (DG), (Ont CA, 2004), supra note
60, at {{ 43–54, for its analysis of voluntariness.
SEXUAL CONSENT AS VOLUNTARY AGREEMENT | 177
abusive uses of power involving intimates and acquaintances remains ill-
defined in law. Formal and informal hierarchical relationships offer many
opportunities for abuse of power. The Criminal Code provides that ‘‘no
consent is obtained’’ when a complainant’s participation in sexual activity is
‘‘induced’’ by the accused’s abuse of a position of trust, power, or author-
ity.82 Similarly, ‘‘no consent is obtained’’ where the complainant submits
or does not resist as a result of the application, threat, or fear of physical
force, fraud, or the exercise of authority.83 But the criminal justice system
has tended to filter out cases involving coercion and abuse of power, trust,
or authority, in the absence of evidence of extreme physical violence. Only
in recent years have the coercive dynamics of abuse of trust, power, and
authority by professionals, educators, coaches, and religious advisers been
recognized by members of the general public and the criminal justice
system. Sexual touching and other forms of sexual activity within the
context of other types of relationships that involve trust, authority, and
inequalities of power are not invariably characterized as criminally
exploitative.84 Complainants, police, and prosecutors often treat assaults
of intimates and acquaintances in contexts that do not involve the deliv-
ery of professional and quasi-professional services to members of the
public, as if they belong in a separate category exempt from the criminal
law simply by virtue of the nature of the relationship between the par-
ties.85 As a consequence, members of the fourth group of vulnerable
82. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c.C-46, s.273.1(2)(c). See also supra, text at notes 14–19.
83. Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c.C-46, s.265(3)(d).
84. Professionals who engage in gratuitous nonconsensual sexual activity are now more
likely to be reported, disciplined, and criminally charged than in the past. Uncertainty still
often surrounds cases of assault by a friend or relative. The challenge for assailees is
compounded when friends or family members deny that the behavior is sexual in nature,
view it as ‘‘hilarious,’’ or at the other extreme, allege that the assailee is the aggressor or
‘‘enticed’’ and ‘‘seduced’’ the assailant. On the impact of social responses on assailee
responses, see R. Campbell, E. Dworkin, & G. Cabral, An Ecological Model of the Impact of
Sexual Assault on Women’s Health, 10 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE & ABUSE 225 (2009); D. LIE-
VORE, NO LONGER SILENT: A STUDY OF WOMEN’S HELP-SEEKING DECISIONS AND
SERVICE RESPONSES TO SEXUAL ASSAULT (2005).
85. See Ewanchuk and discussion, supra note 57. Recent studies documenting the role of
extra-legal distinctions in prosecutorial decision making in England and California include:
Paul Roberts & Candida Saunders, Piloting PTWI—A Socio-Legal Window on Prosecutors’
Assessments of Evidence and Witness Credibility, 30:1 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 101 (2010),
and Kay Levine, The Intimacy Discount, 55 EMORY L.J. 691 (2006). When welfare or social
assistance agencies compete with prosecutors for public resources, prosecutors are arguably
178 | NEW CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW | VOL . 16 | NO . 1 | W INTER 2013
persons identified above—those who are disempowered in relation to the
assailant due to socio-economic or situational factors and circum-
stances—are unlikely to be identified by the criminal justice system as
persons who were ‘‘sexually assaulted’’ unless the assailant is classified as
a ‘‘stranger.’’86
Vulnerable assailees and the seduction paradigm. In theory, an affirmative
sexual consent requirement provides equal protection of the law for the
sexual integrity of everyone in all contexts, including vulnerable persons in
the fourth group whose circumstances may involve multiple forms of
disadvantage. A key strength of the affirmative consent requirement is that
it applies without exception in all contexts. From a political and institu-
tional design perspective, this is arguably one of its most noteworthy
characteristics: universality. The requirement is congruent with fundamen-
tal principles of equality.
Affirmative consent affirms the right of all persons—even those involved
in the routine activities of daily life in the home, workplace, or school—not
to be touched in a sexual manner without their consent. Agreement must
be communicated and voluntary. This appears to address issues of coercion
and abuse of power. Properly interpreted and applied, affirmative consent
clearly does offer better legal protection than the ‘‘‘No’ means ‘No’’’ stan-
dard to anyone who is sexually assaulted, whether by a stranger or a non-
stranger. Yet, as seen above, despite that legal requirement, the seduction
paradigm continues to influence legal analysis and judicial practice; many
assailants continue to benefit from the equation between ‘‘consent’’ and the
‘‘presumption of desire’’ and the ‘‘expectation of deference’’ that ordinarily
characterizes the ‘‘logic’’ of seduction. Deference is commonly expected
and widely interpreted as consent. In addition, complainants who are
physically restrained, touched in a sexual manner, and made aware that
sexual cooperation is the price of release, may choose to comply with some
sexual demands as a means to avoid other forms of imposed, coerced
placed in a conflict of interest whenever a sexual assault case involves an ‘‘intimate’’ who is
economically dependent on the assailant. Local public policy may preempt the issue by
preferring dispositions that keep assailees off the welfare rolls even when the effect is to
return the assailee to a situation of sexual exploitation.
86. Assailees may not recognize or acknowledge the conduct as an offense. Similarly, if
an offense is reported, it may not be classified as a ‘‘founded’’ case unless the assailee is
a child, disabled, or was asleep or unconscious.
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intimacy they do not want and may even find odious.87 Traditionally,
however, such scenarios were often classified by police, prosecutors, and
judges as the successful seduction of a complainant who ‘‘resisted at first,
then changed her mind.’’ Viewed from the perspective of the assailee as
‘‘imposed intimacy,’’ however, ‘‘seduction’’ loses its purported charm.
In practice, the efficacy of the affirmative consent standard depends on
enforcement of the twofold requirement that (1) there must be an agree-
ment, and (2) the agreement must be voluntary. When a ‘‘‘No’ means
‘No’’’ standard is used and analysis is guided by the seduction paradigm,
often no one asks whether there was agreement, and voluntariness is not
analyzed but simply assumed. When legal analysis gives mere lip-service to
the affirmative consent requirement, the analysis is woefully incomplete,
partial, truncated. Asking the wrong question leads to the wrong ‘‘right’’
answer. This denies equal protection of the law to assailees.
To illustrate the difficulties that arise in analysis of sexual consent in
cases involving nonstrangers, consider a hypothetical involving a refugee or
immigrant who is a housekeeper assaulted at work by a member of her
employer’s family.88 If she does not file a police report, she is at risk of
a subsequent assault. It would be naı¨ve for her to assume otherwise, even if
87. Research with humans and other primates shows that dominance and claims of
intimacy may be effectively asserted by simple physical touch, the laying on of hands; touch
appears to have hormonal effects and can operate at an unconscious level to elicit a com-
pliant, cooperative response from the person/animal touched. See B.I. Ditzen et al., Effects of
Different Kinds of Couple Interaction on Cortisol and Heart Rate Responses to Stress in Women,
32:5 PSYCHONEUROENDOCRINOLOGY 565 (2007); T. Field, Touch for Socioemotional and
Physical Well-Being: A Review, 30:4 DEVELOPMENTAL REV. 367 (2010); N. Gueguen,
Touch, Awareness of Touch, and Compliance with a Request, 95:2 PERCEPTUAL & MOTOR
SKILLS 355 (2002); M.J. Hertenstein et al., The Communicative Functions of Touch in Hu-
mans, Nonhuman Primates, and Rats: A Review and Synthesis of the Empirical Research, 132:1
GENETIC, SOC. & GEN. PSYCHOL. MONOGRAPHS 5 (2006); H. MacIntyre et al., Moving
Against the Grain? Investigating the Efficacy of a Touch-Based Intervention in a Climate of
Suspicion, 28:1 PASTORAL CARE IN EDUC. 3 (2010); C. McCabe et al., Cognitive Influences on
the Affective Representation of Touch and the Sight of Touch in the Human Brain, 3:2 SOC.
COGNITIVE & AFFECTIVE NEUROSCIENCE 97 (2008); D.C.F. Vaidis & S.G.M. Halimi-
Falkowicz, Increasing Compliance with a Request: Two Touches are More Effective than One,
103:1 PSYCHOL. REP. 88 (2008).
88. The events in Strauss-Kahn (NYC, 2011) occurred after this hypothetical was created,
but analogies with that case lend additional verisimilitude to the hypothetical. Speculation
about the role political intrigue may have played in that case is irrelevant for analysis of the
fictional-factual circumstances of this hypothetical sexual encounter.
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she told the assailant that she did not wish to participate in sexual activity
with him. The assailant may believe that he ‘‘seduced’’ her, albeit with
considerable effort, and that the only reason she abandoned her efforts at
resistance and did what he demanded was because she responded to his
sexual overtures and desired sexual contact with him. Or, he may recognize
that he assaulted her but assume she fears loss of employment or deportation
more than she dislikes sexual activity with him. In either case, he will likely
assume she will not report the encounter/assault to her employer or police.
In theory the assailant could be charged with forcible confinement and
sexual assault. The assailee would testify that she was confined against her
will, touched in a sexual manner in the absence of her consent, and that she
had no ‘‘real choice’’ and did not act voluntarily when she performed the
sexual favors demanded of her, but solely because she was intimidated and
feared rape, physical injury, loss of employment and deportation. The
prosecutor would argue that: (1) in the circumstances, rape, physical injury,
loss of employment, and possible deportation based on misrepresentations
to immigration authorities about her conduct, were all foreseeable and
adverse consequences of noncooperation; (2) she had no ‘‘real choice’’ other
than to comply with the assailant’s demands; and therefore, (3) the sexual
acts she performed should be deemed to be nonvoluntary as a matter of
law. If the trial judge agreed and ruled accordingly, that would establish the
absence of consent in the actus reus as a matter of law. The case would not
be liable to be dismissed on the ground of reasonable doubt about whether
she did or did not ‘‘consent’’ subjectively, viewed as a question of fact. That
question cannot arise if the factual circumstances are inconsistent with the
prerequisites of voluntariness as a matter of law. Under present Canadian
law, such evidence would enable a judge to hold either that her ostensible
agreement was not ‘‘voluntary’’ within the meaning of section 273.1(1) or, as
provided in section 273.1(3), that in the circumstances her ‘‘consent was not
obtained.’’ Both, of course, are questions of law and grounds for appeal by
either the accused or the prosecutor.
That was theory. It is sound theory, squarely based on valid current
Canadian law, but in practice a quite different analysis and outcome is
likely in a case with these facts. If typical Canadian judicial practices89 were
followed, the question that would be viewed as crucial in determining
89. See Ewanchuk, supra note 42 at {{ 24–40, for Major J’s description of the approach
to be taken to analysis of the actus reus of sexual assault (excerpts are reproduced in the text
SEXUAL CONSENT AS VOLUNTARY AGREEMENT | 181
whether the sexual encounter was a criminal offense—whether ‘‘consent’’
was absent for purposes of proof of the actus reus—would be framed as
a question of ‘‘fact’’ about whether the assailee’s subjective state of mind
was or was not one of ‘‘consent.’’ Subjective consent is a state of mind in
which the assailee ‘‘wants’’ the sexual activity to take place.90 The best
evidence about the assailee’s state of mind is her testimony, but no weight
will be attached to the assailee’s evidence on this issue unless the evidence is
credible. To assist in assessing the credibility of her evidence on this issue,
the circumstances and the conduct of the parties are examined. Evidence
showing that she did engage in conduct that could be interpreted as com-
munication of consent is typically seen to be a basis for reasonable doubt
that she did not subjectively consent. Failure to conclude beyond a reason-
able doubt that the assailee subjectively, in her own mind, did not wish to
engage in the sexual activity, requires dismissal of the case on the ground
that the actus reus of the offense has not been proven.
In practice at present, such a case, if it were reported, is therefore
unlikely to be classified as a ‘‘founded’’ case. Indeed, few such cases will
be classified as ‘‘founded’’ by the police and selected for prosecution if the
‘‘logic’’ of the traditional seduction paradigm is used to guide the investi-
gation and the precharge and pretrial analysis of the facts. The paradigm
intimates that mutual sexual attraction is ubiquitous between parties who
know one another and may, at any time, lead to consensual sexual contact,
with or without some initial resistance. No matter how vehemently a com-
plainant asserts that subjectively she did not consent, once there is any basis
for reasonable doubt about her credibility on that issue, the case is liable to
be dismissed. Unless the assailee was subjected to extreme violence or an
equivalent classic form of coercion that is easily recognizable as a reason for
the assailee’s choice to comply, despite her wish not to, successful prose-
cution of these cases is difficult, if not impossible.
In most cases with facts similar to those in this hypothetical, the police
and the prosecutor can anticipate that at trial defense counsel will argue
that the complainant’s sexually compliant conduct was the result of either
below at note 103). At present, this passage continues to be routinely cited and followed by
trial judges across Canada.
90. Id. At this stage the issue is whether the actus reus of the offense is established. Only if
the actus reus is established, and therefore an offense is found to have been committed, does
the question arise of whether the assailant was aware (knew or was reckless or willfully blind)
that the consent was not, or might not be, voluntary.
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her ‘‘desire’’ for sex with the accused or her desire to obtain material or
social benefits of some sort from the accused and, in any event, cannot be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt to be solely the result of the factors she
alleges shaped her decision to act as she did. In general, an assailee’s
credibility is immediately placed in doubt if her evidence is that she did
not wish to participate even though her words or conduct communicated
affirmative consent to the sexual activity in question. Police and prosecu-
tors know from experience that it is difficult if not impossible to persuade
the trier of fact that subjective consent was absent when the complainant
could to be seen to lack credibility on that very issue. Most such complaints
are disposed of as ‘‘unfounded’’ or not selected for prosecution because
conviction is believed to be unlikely. Therefore no judge has an opportu-
nity to hear the evidence and determine as a matter of law whether the
circumstances in which the offense occurred were consistent with the
prerequisites of voluntariness in the complainant. As a consequence, case
screening decisions must be made on an individual, case-by-case basis,
without the guidance from jurisprudence on consent in the actus reus,
including voluntariness and its prerequisites, which the judiciary could
develop if these cases went to trial. Without legal guidance on those issues,
police and prosecutors necessarily rely on their personal beliefs and
attitudes.
It might be assumed that assailees who resist, albeit ‘‘unsuccessfully,’’
rather than cooperate or actively participate, could anticipate a different
response from police and prosecutors. That is not necessarily true. Those
complaints may be classified as ‘‘unfounded’’ or dismissed on the ground
that the complainant could have chosen to resist more vigorously, must
have chosen not to do so, and therefore clearly consented. The theory of
the defense in such a case is grounded on the same defunct notion that
bedevils the popular ‘‘‘No’ means ‘No’’’ slogan—that failure to resist or
resist effectively is consent.
To illustrate this problem, the scenario involving the housekeeper who
participates actively by performing fellatio to avoid being raped, may be
contrasted with one in which the assailant approaches the complainant,
holds her body against his body, touches her in sexual manner, and rubs his
genitals against her body. Here she does not actively participate, but there is
also no suggestion that she resisted. The charge in this case might be one
count of sexual assault. Strictly speaking, however, there are two distinct
offenses in this example: the sexual assault (sexual touching in the absence
SEXUAL CONSENT AS VOLUNTARY AGREEMENT | 183
of consent) and the use of physical restraint to prevent the assailee’s
escape.91 In this example, she is not offered an opportunity to bargain her
way out of the situation more quickly. No attempt is made to secure her
complicity in the sexual activity. The former example, in which her active
participation in her own degradation is demanded, arguably entails a greater
affront to her personhood, autonomy, and human dignity.
Assume this second assailee files a complaint and you, as a member of
the local police force, must determine whether the case is ‘‘founded.’’ You
should anticipate that defense counsel will want to know why the com-
plainant did not refuse or resist, by means of words or conduct, at all. The
fact that she did not participate actively will not necessarily make convic-
tion more likely than in the previous hypothetical, even though the evi-
dence shows that she neither said nor did anything and therefore cannot be
said to have communicated affirmative consent. If a trial judge follows the
map for analysis of the actus reus described in Ewanchuk and routinely used
by trial judges across Canada at present, the outcome will turn on the
credibility of the complainant’s assertion that in her own mind, subjec-
tively, she did not consent. Even if all the other aspects of the prosecution’s
case are established, even if the complainant’s testimony is credible with
respect to all of the objective factual circumstances of the case—the where,
who, what, when, how—any reasonable doubt that the complainant’s
subjective state of mind was not one of consent, that she did not ‘‘want’’
the sexual contact, will require dismissal of the case. If the actus reus map
described in Ewanchuk continues to be routinely used to guide legal anal-
ysis, such outcomes will continue to be common in many cases involving
passive complainants even though submission is not consent under Cana-
dian law.92 If trial judges instead determined, as a matter of law, whether
there was ‘‘agreement’’ and, if so, whether it was ‘‘voluntary,’’ as required by
section 273.1(1), some of these very same cases would lead to convictions.
Scenarios involving forcible confinement and sexual assault appear to be
relatively common in assaults that take place between members of extended
91. See State of Wisconsin v. Long, Wis.2d 92, 765 N.W.2d 557 (2009), a decision by the
Wisconsin Supreme Court affirming convictions for second degree sexual assault and
forcible confinement. The assailant held the assailee in a tight hug and thereby caused his
penis to touch her buttocks and inner thigh. Like Canadian law, Wisconsin law requires
affirmative consent; the evidence did not show that the complainant consented to either the
sexual contact or the physical restraint used to facilitate the sexual contact.
92. R v. M. (M.L.), supra note 67.
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families, spouses or partners, acquaintances, and other nonstrangers. Phys-
ical restraint or presence in a shared living or work space creates an oppor-
tunity for sexual contact with or without a demand that the assailee actively
participate in the sexual activity. Restraint may be direct physical restraint
of the assailee’s body, or control of a space or the means required to escape
from a specific physical location, such as a car, a room, a building, or even
an isolated location outdoors. In some cases the assailee may cooperate or
fail to resist in order to terminate the sexual activity (which may have
already commenced or which may appear unavoidable) as soon as possible
with minimal exposure to risk of harm (which could take a variety of forms
from pregnancy to infection to the enhanced psychological and physical
trauma entailed by a greater degree of intimacy). In other cases, compliance
or active participation may be extracted by a promise of release from
confinement or restraint or manipulation of social fears, such as the threat
of being denounced as a sexual aggressor or deviant, shunned by a family,
workplace, or acquaintance network, fired from a job, deported from
a country, or prosecuted for a sexual or nonsexual offense. The assailee
may fear that revelation or discovery of the sexual activity will shatter
relationships within a group or be psychologically damaging and socially
destructive for other adults or children for whom the assailee feels respon-
sible. In addition, some assailees will have been assaulted previously, per-
haps on more than one occasion, and may be socialized or conditioned to
comply and remain silent, having been taught that this is a ‘‘normal’’ and
‘‘appropriate’’ way to deal with a ‘‘private’’ matter. If the previous assault(s)
occurred in childhood or adolescence, these lessons may be especially
compelling. Only the naı¨ve assailee will assume there will be no recurrence
or escalation of the assaultive behavior. But many assailees will be naı¨ve,
and even an assailee who realizes she is at risk of being assaulted again, may
nonetheless be paralyzed by apprehension about the unknown conse-
quences of disclosure for herself and others. In nonstranger assaults, the
assailant is often someone the assailee has been socialized and conditioned
to care for and protect, even to her own detriment.
Therefore all cases in which physical restraint or control over the means
of escape is used to facilitate sexual assault by limiting the choices available
to the complainant should be analyzed as cases of sexual assault and forcible
confinement regardless of whether active participation is demanded from
the assailee. Even when the charge is limited to one count of sexual assault,
the use of physical restraint or forcible confinement to impose either
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passive or participatory sexual intimacy on an assailee creates a circumstance
in which valid consent is impossible, as a matter of common law and
pursuant to section 273.1. Restraint and forcible confinement are inconsis-
tent with the conditions that are essential for voluntariness, both at com-
mon law and pursuant to the statutory definition of consent as ‘‘voluntary
agreement’’ in section 273.1. Proof that restraint or forcible confinement—
physical or psychological constraints that curtail an assailee’s freedom to
remove herself from the situation—facilitated sexual intimacy, should suf-
fice to establish as a matter of law that consent was absent within the
meaning of section 273.1 for the purpose of proof of the actus reus.93
Whether the circumstances that limited the assailee’s freedom were preex-
isting or imposed by the assailant is irrelevant. The crucial question is
whether the circumstances of the assailee at the time of the assault were
consistent with the conditions required for the exercise of free and auton-
omous agency. By contrast, the approaches commonly used by Canadian
trial judges to structure analysis of consent in the actus reus routinely result
in truncation of the reasoning process and errors of law.94
C. Proposed Judicial Practice: Analysis Guided by the Legal Definition of
Consent as ‘‘Voluntary Agreement’’
If decisions in sexual assault cases are to be based on the law, rather than on
cultural paradigms, judicial practice must be altered to ensure that consent
is properly assessed in all cases. There is no consent or ‘‘voluntary agree-
ment’’ unless there are words or conduct by the complainant that commu-
nicate agreement, and no agreement is valid unless it is voluntary. Both
elements are required. To interpret and apply the definition of sexual
consent codified in section 273.1, judges will need to develop the jurispru-
dence required to determine when a complainant’s agreement to sexual
activity is ‘‘voluntary,’’ building on common law principles within a con-
stitutional framework. At present the jurisprudence in Canada suggests that
‘‘voluntariness’’ requires that the assailee be ‘‘functionally autonomous,’’ in
a position to exercise volition freely among alternatives, not in a position
that afforded him or her no ‘‘real’’ or ‘‘meaningful choice.’’
93. Dissociation and ‘‘frozen fear’’ are both common psychological responses to sexual
assault; both limit an assailee’s ability to resist or escape.
94. See MacFie and Stender, supra note 60.
186 | NEW CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW | VOL . 16 | NO . 1 | W INTER 2013
In this article it is posited that unless the factual circumstances estab-
lished in the evidence are consistent with the conditions the law deems to
be prerequisites of functional autonomy, ‘‘free’’ exercise of volition, and
‘‘real’’ choice, any agreement communicated by the assailee with respect to
the sexual activity in question must be deemed to be ‘‘non-voluntary,’’ as
a matter of law, for the purposes of determining whether the actus reus of
sexual assault has been established.95 Judicial practice must be altered to
ensure that this issue is determined in every sexual assault case that goes to
trial.
It is therefore proposed that the judiciary adopt, and require counsel to
adhere to, the following practices in all sexual assault cases:
1. The evidence adduced shall, to the extent possible, include the details
of the factual circumstances of the alleged assault, including the words
and conduct of the both parties, and the significance of those circum-
stances as experienced and interpreted by the complainant.
2. Where the evidence adduced by the prosecutor and defense counsel,
or placed before the court through cross-examination or other means,
does not provide full details of the factual circumstances of the alleged
assault and their significance to the complainant, the trial judge shall,
at public expense, appoint independent counsel whose responsibili-
ties shall include:
(a) identifying, interviewing, and calling additional witnesses as
required, including any expert witnesses the independent coun-
sel deems appropriate,
(b) further direct examination and cross-examination of witnesses
who have already testified,
(c) direct examination of any additional witnesses called, and
95. This is a question of fundamental normative politics that each jurisdiction will need
to decide within the framework of its own legal system. In Canada, the question has been
formally addressed in the context of cases in which the ‘‘moral voluntariness’’ of an accused’s
conduct has been at issue. The leading case is R. v. Ruzic, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 687 (the accused
was charged with importing drugs and acquitted on the ground that in the circumstances,
she had no real choice but to comply with the demands of her handler in the exporting
jurisdiction; the Court held that it would be fundamentally unjust, a violation of s.7 of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, to convict and punish her for an act that was not
voluntary, i.e., the product of a free will and a body under her control unhindered by
external constraints.) Accused and complainants are in wholly different positions in relation
to the offense and the criminal process. These differences may prove to be significant in the
analysis of voluntariness.
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(d) participation in final argument with respect to
(i) the factual circumstances proven by the evidence,
(ii) the impact of those circumstances on the complainant,
and
(iii) whether, as a matter of law, there was agreement, and
whether the circumstances were or were not consistent
with the prerequisites of functional autonomy and vol-
untariness in the complainant.
3. The judge presiding at trial shall determine:
(a) whether there is any evidence of words or conduct by the com-
plainant that communicated agreement to the sexual activity in
question, with the accused, at the time in question;
(b) where there is such evidence, whether it is sufficient evidence, if
found credible by the trier of fact, to give rise to a defense of
consent leading to a lawful acquittal; or
(c) whether the case is one in which, pursuant to section 273.1, there
could be no valid consent as a matter of law because the factual
circumstances were not consistent with the prerequisites of vol-
untariness in the complainant (where the question is a question
of law based on the proven facts, not a question of fact).96
4. When deciding the question of law under 3(c), the trial judge shall
consider all the factual circumstances that impeded or impinged on
the complainant’s freedom of movement or functional autonomy, or
otherwise deprived her of a ‘‘real’’ and meaningful opportunity to
refuse to engage in or be subjected to the sexual activity without
apprehension of any consequences that were significant or important
to her.
Use of this approach to the interpretation and application of the affir-
mative consent requirement will afford everyone, including members of the
fourth vulnerable group—those who are comparatively disempowered in
relation to the assailant as a consequence of socio-economic relationships
96. Where the evidence shows the assailant was aware of the factual circumstances that
are held to be inconsistent as a matter of law with the prerequisites of voluntariness and
voluntary agreement by the assailee, no defense of belief in consent is available; failure to
appreciate the legal significance of facts of which one is aware is a mistake of law and does
not exculpate. Lack of awareness of crucial factual circumstances would give rise to a pos-
sible mens rea defense unless the lack of awareness arose from recklessness, willful blindness,
or self-induced intoxication.
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and conditions—with more effective protection by the sexual assault laws
and lead to further development of the jurisprudence of voluntariness.
When the conditions required for voluntariness are compromised, the
absence of consent in the actus reus is established. Similarly, no evidence
that agreement was communicated or undisputed evidence showing agree-
ment was not communicated establishes the absence of consent for the
purposes of proof of the actus reus. Passivity, silence, and failure to resist do
not communicate voluntary agreement. Refusal and saying ‘‘no’’ do not
communicate voluntary agreement. Questions 3(c) and criteria proposed
under item 4 may often be determinative for the outcome in cases in
which: (i) there is disputed or undisputed evidence that the assailee com-
municated agreement or actively participated in the sexual activity, or (ii)
there is reasonable doubt that agreement was not communicated by words
or conduct. In such cases a judicial ruling that the factual circumstances
were inconsistent with the prerequisites of voluntariness in the complainant
as a matter of law will establish the absence of consent for the purposes of
proof of the actus reus. Appeals challenging rulings on the questions of law
will develop the jurisprudence on ‘‘agreement’’ and ‘‘voluntariness’’ and pro-
vide more guidance for police, prosecutors, and trial judges in future cases.
Comparison of the operation of the present and proposed approaches in
analysis of sexual assault cases illustrates a general proposition that applies
to all initiatives that attempt to use legal tools to achieve societal change.
Law reform without corresponding changes in pretrial screening and judicial
practice in the lower courts, and in the criteria and process used to receive and
admit evidence, select facts, and select and map legal rules and criteria onto the
facts, does not inevitably result in implementation of the reforms and a change
in the patterns of law enforcement. Reform of substantive law, without changes
in analytic approaches and practices, may not change much of anything at all.
The specific changes in analytic approach and judicial practice that are
crucial in this context where the objective is effective implementation of
the affirmative consent requirements include:
(A) the addition of mandatory steps in the assessment of consent in the
actus reus to determine:
(1) whether there is evidence of actual words or conduct that com-
municated voluntary agreement, and
(2) whether the circumstances established by the evidence were not
inconsistent with the conditions essential as a matter of law for
voluntariness in the assailee, and if so,
SEXUAL CONSENT AS VOLUNTARY AGREEMENT | 189
( 3) whether the evidence of the communication of agreement, if it
were found credible by the trier of fact, would be sufficient to
give rise to a defense of consent leading to a lawful acquittal, and
(B) characterization of all of these questions as questions of law, not fact.
Where there is no evidence or insufficient evidence of communicated
agreement, or the circumstances were inconsistent with the prerequisites of
voluntariness in the complainant, then the case is one in which, as a matter
of law, there was no consent; this establishes the absence of consent for the
purpose of proof of the actus reus of the offense.97 Failure to decide (1)
whether there was evidence of the communication of agreement, (2)
whether the prerequisites of voluntariness were fatally compromised in the
circumstances, (3) whether the evidence of communicated consent was
sufficient to give rise a consent defense that could result in a lawful acquit-
tal, or (4) failure to decide these questions correctly, would each be ground
for appeal on a question of law.
D. Voluntariness and Agreement as Questions of Law
Assessment of whether an assailee’s agreement was voluntary in fact pre-
supposes that there was agreement and that the conditions the law holds to
be essential for voluntariness were not compromised. It follows, on grounds
of law and policy, that rulings on those questions of law are required in each
and every sexual assault case. If there was no ‘‘agreement’’ within the
meaning of section 273.1, consent was clearly absent. Voluntariness is only
at issue when there was agreement. The ruling with respect to voluntariness
applies a legal test to findings of fact about the factual circumstances, their
significance as experienced and interpreted by the assailee, and their impact
on her functional autonomy. The legal prerequisites of ‘‘voluntariness’’
include freedom from psychological and physical constraints on choice,
a ‘‘real’’ or meaningful opportunity to choose to do or not to do
something.98
97. This approach should be used systematically in sexual assault cases to determine
whether the material facts and circumstances proven by the evidence are ones in which there
is no consent as a matter of law under any of the provisions of s.265 or s.273.1. Cf. Steve
Coughlan, Annotation to R. v. Stender available at 2004 Carswell Ont 3378 (Ont. C.A.).
98. Leading Canadian cases on voluntariness as a prerequisite of valid consent by an
assailee include R. v. Stanley (1977) 36 CCC (2d) 216 (BCCA), Norberg v. Wynrib, [1992] 2 S.
C.R. 226, and R. v. Saint-Laurent (1994), 90 CCC (3d) 291, [1994] RJQ 69 (CA), leave to
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The ruling on the legal question with respect to voluntariness requires
an assessment of whether the circumstances are consistent with the law’s
understanding of the conditions that must be met if a choice or decision is
to be regarded as ‘‘voluntary.’’ The ruling is a ruling about a question of
law, not a determination about whether the assailee consented or ‘‘volun-
tarily’’ agreed as a question of fact. If, and only if, the ruling on the question
of law determines that the circumstances were not inconsistent with the
prerequisites of voluntariness, is a decision either required or permitted
about whether the assailee’s communication of agreement was voluntary
in fact.99
The ruling on the question of law requires examination of whether the
circumstances involved the use or threatened use of social power or physical
force of any type against the complainant or her interests, broadly defined.
At this stage, however, the issue is not whether coercion or other factors
were the effective ‘‘cause’’ of an individual assailee’s subsequent conduct. It
is crucial to recognize that the assailee is not an accused person and is not
required to justify her choices. The issue is not whether the assailee sub-
jectively believed herself, correctly or not, to have a choice that might have
enabled her to avoid compliance or participation, or why, as a matter of
fact, she did whatever she did, but rather simply whether the factual
circumstances as established by the evidence are consistent as a matter of
law with the prerequisites of voluntariness. On grounds of legal policy,
sexual consent can only be valid and legally effective when the conditions
required for voluntary choice are present; if those conditions do not exist,
there can be no valid consent. The claim is not that the assailee’s right not
to be sexually assaulted is enforceable if and only if the choices she made
can be shown to have been caused by coercion or some other positive or
negative external influence.100 The assailee is not an accused person assert-
ing the defense of duress or necessity. The actual impact of the
appeal to the SCC refused 66 QAC 160n. See also Stender, supra note 60. Stender is rarely
cited, however, suggesting that the decision is not being raised in argument by counsel. In
addition, pretrial case screening may be preventing some cases in which the approach used
in Stender would be applicable from proceeding to trial because police or prosecutors fail to
recognize that ostensible consent is arguably vitiated in the circumstances.
99. Analysis of related issues appears in Vandervort, Affirmative Consent, supra note 8, at
429–32.
100. When a finding that consent was not present is made contingent on proof that
coercion, not desire or passion, caused the assailee to make the choices she did, many
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circumstances on the specific choice made by an individual complainant is
not relevant unless the trial judge determines that the circumstances were
consistent with the prerequisites of voluntariness, a question of law. This is
the only instance in which voluntariness, viewed as a question of fact, must
be determined.
The proposed approach acknowledges the difference between the rela-
tionships of the assailee and the accused, respectively, to the criminal law
and the criminal justice process, and acknowledges the parallels between
other offenses of interpersonal violence that involve domination and con-
trol and sexual assault, in which, by definition, the assailant requires the
assailee to participate actively, comply, or submit. In sexual assault, it is the
assailant’s use of the circumstances and his control over the complainant to
facilitate the assault that negatives the very possibility of valid consent in the
actus reus and characterizes the conduct as criminal. The essential elements
of the offense are sexual contact and contempt for the sexual autonomy of
the complainant, not mere sexual contact. Sexual activity is not assault,
unless the assailant disregards the autonomous equal personhood of the
complainant.
Despite this, traditional case analysis ordinarily does not concern itself
with whether the complainant agreed and whether the circumstances were
consistent with the prerequisites of voluntariness and autonomy on the part
of the complainant as the law understands ‘‘agreement’’ and ‘‘voluntari-
ness’’ Instead, analysis of consent in the actus reus typically turns on find-
ings of fact, not law, about the subjective state of mind of the individual
complainant with respect to consent. This inevitably invites the judge, and
the jurors in a jury trial, to interpret the issue of the complainant’s subjec-
tive consent through the lens of the seduction paradigm, rather than the
law, and to focus their attention—through that lens—on the credibility of
the complainant’s assertion that she did not consent subjectively. Previ-
ously we saw that in the absence of one or more of the classic forms of
coercion—which are not part of the seduction paradigm—it is simply
taken for granted that the words and conduct of the complainant are
voluntary, in fact. The complainant is assumed to be an agent who volun-
tarily chooses to do what she does. Indeed this is thought to be part of the
assailees are denied effective protection of the law, as seen above in the impact of the
seduction paradigm on legal decisions.
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charm of seduction. This is also the reason the complainant is so easily seen
as a responsible agent who made a choice, not a ‘‘victim.’’
A related effect of the traditional approach to case analysis is seen at the
appeal stage. When the presence or absence of consent in the actus reus is
characterized as a question of fact, the conclusion at trial on that issue is
ordinarily insulated from appellate review, as long as there is an evidentiary
basis for the conclusion. When there is reasonable doubt that consent—
viewed as a question of fact—was absent, the accused is acquitted and has
no reason to appeal, whereas the Crown can only appeal on questions of
law, not fact. In practice, the Crown rarely appeals even when an appeal on
a question of law is available. This has ensured that the appellate jurispru-
dence on consent in the actus reus of sexual assault remains comparatively
undeveloped.
With the proposed approach, fewer cases turn on: (1) the credibility of
an assailee’s claim that subjectively, ‘‘in her own mind,’’ she did not con-
sent; and (2) findings of fact (as opposed to law) about whether she did or
did not agree voluntarily. The crucial findings of fact will instead be those
related to the factual circumstances of the alleged assault and the conduct of
the parties. Whether those facts show that there was ‘‘agreement’’ and
whether the circumstances are consistent with the prerequisites of ‘‘volun-
tariness’’ are questions of law. Failure to appreciate the legal significance of
the circumstances and the parties’ words and conduct, and failure to inter-
pret and apply the legal meaning of ‘‘agreement’’ and ‘‘voluntariness’’ and
its prerequisites correctly, are all errors of law and grounds for appeal. The
net effect is to move the focus of sexual assault trials away from the
credibility of the assailee with respect to whether her subjective state of
mind was that of consent, and put the focus on the objective factual
circumstances, the conduct of the parties, and the implications of both for
the functional autonomy of the assailee.101 The proposed approach applies
101. The assailee’s credibility with respect to objective circumstances (such as whether
force was used and events related to assault) is less vulnerable to successful challenge.
Multiple sources of evidence are often available to assist in proving objective factual cir-
cumstances. By contrast, conclusions about an assailee’s subjective state of mind requires
leaps of inference and interpretation that are far more vulnerable to reasonable doubt based
on challenges to credibility of complainant. See Lucinda Vandervort, Mistaken Belief in
Consent,RapeMyths, andTheories of Fabrication, (Jan. 2010) (unpublished, archivedwith the
author), on reframing and reformulating the questions related to complainant credibility to
focus on objectively observable factual circumstances, conduct, and verbal communication.
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to stranger and nonstranger assaults alike, but will have its greatest impact
on the outcomes in cases involving nonstrangers. At present, in cases
involving nonstrangers, context and relationship are routinely used to
challenge the assailee’s credibility, raise questions about whether the sub-
jective state of mind of the assailee was or was not that of consent or desire,
invoke the seduction paradigm (thereby insinuating voluntariness), and
thus categorize the assault as a ‘‘private,’’ noncriminal encounter between
‘‘intimates,’’ a successful ‘‘seduction’’ with a measure of mutuality, and not
rape or some other form of sexual assault.
An assailant’s use of forcible confinement, restraint, or manipulation of the
situational and socio-economic factors and circumstances that make the assailee
vulnerable, to facilitate sexual assault, must be held to negative the assailee’s
personal autonomy as a matter of law. If there was no express affirmative
agreement, or if the factual circumstances were inconsistent with the pre-
requisites of voluntariness and autonomous choice, the conclusion follows,
as a matter of law, that sexual consent or voluntary agreement was absent
both at common law and within the meaning of section 273.1. Under such
circumstances the defense of consent is unavailable in law and may not be
considered because it could not lead to a lawful acquittal. That also elim-
inates the need for proof of the complainant’s subjective state of mind on
the issue of consent as a question of fact, a requirement that has been
a significant legal impediment to effective enforcement of sexual assault
laws in cases involving nonstrangers. Use of the proposed approach to
analyze consent in the actus reus should ensure that fewer sexual assault
cases involving nonstrangers are classified as unfounded, never prosecuted,
or dismissed at trial.
Ordinarily, an assailant is aware of the assailee’s words and conduct and
of the factual circumstances and cannot claim to have been mistaken about
those facts. When an accused was aware that the complainant did not
communicate agreement or was aware of factual circumstances that in law
are inconsistent with the prerequisites of voluntariness in the assailee,
a mistaken belief in ‘‘voluntary agreement’’—that is, ‘‘consent’’—is not
available. To fail to appreciate the legal significance of known facts is
a mistake of law, not an excuse negativing mens rea.102
One practical effect of the proposed approach is to make the defense of
consent simply unavailable in law in many cases involving circumstances of
102. Ewanchuk, supra note 42, at { 51.
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blatant inequality between the assailant and the assailee. Strauss-Kahn, for
example, was arguably such a case. Some commentators may suggest that
the proposal threatens to impose unacceptable constraints on sexual
‘‘choice’’ and is ‘‘unworkable.’’ It will definitely be inconvenient for those
accustomed to sexual deference, but it is hardly unworkable from either
a practical or a legal perspective. One inevitable consequence of its adop-
tion will be rapid development of the jurisprudence on ‘‘voluntariness.’’
Full implementation would also likely generate more support for measures
to reduce inequality.
In cases involving nonstrangers—spouses, friends, and acquaintances—
the proposed approach will often lead to different outcomes because agree-
ment and voluntariness will no longer be presumed. Words or conduct that
communicate voluntary agreement, that is, affirmative consent, will be
required in each case. Consent will ‘‘not be obtained’’ as a matter of law
when the circumstances are inconsistent with the prerequisites of volun-
tariness. Cases will no longer be liable to be dismissed simply on the ground
of doubts about the credibility of the complainant’s claims about her
subjective state of mind in relation to consent. As a consequence, many
cases that are now classified as ‘‘unfounded’’ or not selected for prosecution
will proceed to trial.
E. Blind Allegiance to Traditional Judicial Practice
At this point it is useful, though sobering, to revisit the issues raised earlier
in discussion about the choices police, prosecutors, and judges make in the
process of ‘‘mapping’’ the law onto the facts of a case. The traditional
approach to analysis of consent in the actus reus of sexual assault is
described by Major J. in Ewanchuk, where he stated:
. . . for the purposes of determining the absence of consent as an element of
the actus reus, the actual state of mind of the complainant is determinative.
At this point, the trier of fact is only concerned with the complainant’s
perspective. The approach is purely subjective. . . .
. . .
While the complainant’s testimony is the only source of direct evidence
as to her state of mind, credibility must still be assessed by the trial judge, or
jury, in light of all the evidence. It is open to the accused to claim that the
complainant’s words and actions, before and during the incident, raise
a reasonable doubt against her assertion that she, in her mind, did not want
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the sexual touching to take place. If, however, as occurred in this case, the
trial judge believes the complainant that she subjectively did not consent,
the Crown has discharged its obligation to prove the absence of consent.
The complainant’s statement that she did not consent is a matter of
credibility to be weighed in light of all the evidence, including any
ambiguous conduct. The question at this stage is purely one of credibility,
and whether the totality of the complainant’s conduct is consistent with her
claim of nonconsent.103
Twelve years later, these comments are routinely quoted and followed or
simply followed by trial judges throughout Canada in sexual assault
cases.104 This is extremely unfortunate. The effect is to perpetuate the
traditional preoccupation with the credibility of the complainant’s asser-
tion that subjectively, in her own mind, she did not consent, even though,
under present law it is the communication of voluntary agreement or
affirmative consent—a ‘‘yes’’—that is actually required in all cases. To
suggest that the trier of fact must base a decision about consent on a con-
clusion about the complainant’s state of mind in cases in which there is no
evidence of the actual communication of agreement invites serious confusion
and error. In the absence of agreement, there is no consent as defined in
section 273.1(1). If there is no communication of agreement and therefore
no consent, voluntariness is not at issue.When voluntariness is not at issue as
a matter of either law or fact, the subjective state of mind of the complainant is
immaterial. The only cases in which voluntariness needs to be determined are
those in which there is ostensible affirmative consent, that is, words or conduct
that are essentially ‘‘yes.’’ Ewanchuk was not such a case. To ask the wrong
question is a recipe for the wrong answer. That is the case here. To inquire
into the subjective state of mind of a complainant on the assumption that
cases always turn on the complainant’s credibility with respect to this issue,
that it is always necessary either to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt
that subjective consent was absent or dismiss the case, is to invite an answer
based on the seduction paradigm and avoid the law. The law has better
tools. They should be used.
The approach to analysis of consent in the actus reus described by Major
J in Ewanchuk should only be used when (1) the complainant actually
103. Id. at {{ 27, 29–30.
104. A review of the reasons for decision at trial in sexual assault cases reported since the
1999 Ewanchuk decision was released, revealed no evidence to the contrary.
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communicated agreement and (2) the circumstances were not inconsistent
with the prerequisites of voluntariness in the complainant as a matter of
law, and therefore it must be determined whether the communication was
voluntary as a question of fact. In Ewanchuk, refusal was communicated
three times. There could be no question about the absence of consent. The
appeal did not raise any issues related to consent in the actus reus. Major’s
remarks about consent in the actus reus were obiter; they were not generated
on the basis of the adversarial appeal process. Nonetheless these remarks
appear to have misled many police, prosecutors, and trial judges since 1999,
leading to the retention of traditional but defunct case screening criteria
and practices. Reliance on old maps has predictably regressive effects. It is
unknown whether there is a better example of this phenomenon in the
legal literature than that provided by the influence of these passages from
the reasons for judgment in Ewanchuk on decision making in sexual assault
cases throughout Canada for over a decade.
The continuing influence of traditional modes of thinking and talking
about consent in the actus reus may also be due in part to the considerable
emphasis in public and professional legal discussions of the 1992 Code
amendments and the Ewanchuk case on the slogan ‘‘‘No’ means ‘No’,’’
which may be interpreted by some as suggesting that failure to resist, or
resist ‘‘enough,’’ is consent even though, in law, submission is not consent.
By contrast, there has been comparatively little emphasis on the require-
ment for affirmative consent. Since 1999, judges have found it convenient
to quote the above passages from Mr. Justice Major’s reasons that list the
elements of the actus reus105 and describe the process to be followed in
assessing the credibility of the complainant’s assertion that subjectively she
did not consent. Each rote repetition encourages police, prosecutors, and
other judges to continue to focus on the complainant’s credibility with
respect to her subjective state of mind and treat her credibility on that issue
as pivotal—just as they did prior to the 1992 amendments to the Code and
the 1999 Ewanchuk decision—without ascertaining whether the complain-
ant actually communicated affirmative consent or voluntary agreement.
Old questions, like old slogans, generate old answers—questions and answers
that are now also the wrong questions and wrong answers in a significant
105. In Ewanchuk, supra note 42, at { 25, Major J. states, ‘‘The actus reus of sexual assault
is established by the proof of three elements: (i) touching, (ii) the sexual nature of the
contact, and (iii) the absence of consent.’’
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portion of cases. Asking the wrong question in law often invites the wrong
answer. In the end it involves a ‘‘mapping’’ problem.
Changing the effects that a substantive law will have as applied, requires
changing the practices followed in legal analysis of the evidence. But trial
judges did not alter their practices in response to either the 1992 Code
amendments or the reasons for judgment by the Supreme Court of Canada
in cases dealing with sexual consent in the 1990s. The reasons for judgment
in Ewanchuk in 1999 then simply reaffirmed and further perpetuated the
traditional focus on the complainant’s credibility with respect to her sub-
jective state of mind. Trial judges still have not changed the patterns they
use in analysis of consent in the actus reus of sexual assault to reflect the new
conceptualization of sexual consent. The result is that even now, twenty
years after the 1992 amendments and years after the decisions inM. (M.L.),
Park, and Esau, traditional maps and schemas continue to be used to
structure the legal reasoning process and make sense of the facts in sexual
assault cases. Gaps in the legal rules, practices, and procedures used to make
factual inferences and findings of fact about consent in the actus reus
continue to be filled by nonlegal beliefs, assumptions, and generalizations,
including those associated with the seduction paradigm. By contrast, im-
plementation of the approach proposed here will require trial judges and
counsel to adopt new practices in legal reasoning to ensure that the neces-
sary legal questions are decided, in the proper sequence, and on the basis of
evidence that is sufficient as a matter of law.
F. Precharge and Pretrial Decision Making—Police and Prosecutors
Whether sexual assault cases lead to charges and proceed to trial depends on
the exercise of police and prosecutorial discretion. Police and prosecutors
will often err in their analysis of the facts in sexual assault cases involving
nonstrangers if they continue to interpret the law of sexual consent through
the lens of the seduction paradigm. Old habits can be resilient. Implemen-
tation of the proposals in this article will require retraining programs for
police, prosecutors, and any other personnel involved in the investigation
and pretrial screening and preparation of sexual assault cases.
In law, the assailee is under no legal obligation to say or do anything. It is
improper to suggest otherwise. Assailees must be permitted to do and not
do whatever they believe is necessary to minimize harm to themselves in
the whole of the circumstances without being deemed to have waived
198 | NEW CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW | VOL . 16 | NO . 1 | W INTER 2013
protection of their right not to be assaulted.106 On occasion, this may
include lying, dissembling, or feigning desire to engage in the sexual activ-
ity the assailant demands.107 No matter what the assailee said or did,
evidence of circumstances in which consent as defined in section 273.1 was
impossible as a matter of law, suffices to establish the absence of consent
for the purpose of analysis of the actus reus, just as proof that the com-
plainant was younger than the age of consent would.
Precharge and pretrial decision making practices used by police and
prosecutors in the criminal justice system must change to reflect the law,
not popular narratives, myths, beliefs, and assumptions. This has implica-
tions for interviewing and file preparation. When the initial question is not
‘‘Did you say ‘No’?’’ or ‘‘Did you resist?’’ but is instead cast as an open-
ended request to ‘‘Please tell me what happened, when, how, and where it
happened, in detail, and from the beginning,’’ the analytic focus shifts from
the assailee to the conduct of the assailant, the whole of the circumstances,
and the impact of those circumstances on the assailee.108 This transforms
the legal discourse. The shift in rhetoric reflects the analytic shift from
106. There are similarities between sexual consent and waiver of a constitutional right.
Josephine Ross, Blaming the Victim: ‘‘Consent’’ within the Fourth Amendment and Rape Law,
26:1 HARV. J. ON RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 1 (2010) asserts: ‘‘the Fourth Amendment fails
to recognize that subtle forms of coercion are incompatible with true consent. Both Fourth
Amendment and rape law blame subjects who submit to subtle coercion, telling them they
had a choice.’’ In police misconduct trials, difficulties are compounded when defense
counsel use a series of strategic questions in cross-examination to reconfigure the evidence of
key prosecution witnesses and construct a narrative of police-citizen interaction in terms
that appear to be consistent with free choice and voluntary compliance. See DIANA EADES,
COURTROOM TALK AND NEOCOLONIAL CONTROL (2008), for close analysis of the lin-
guistic strategies defense counsel used to obtain dismissal of the charges in the Pinkenba case
at the preliminary hearing. The problem appears to be common in the interrogation and
cross-examination of most witnesses of all ages in sexual assault cases. In recognition of the
impact of cross-examination techniques on witness testimony at trial, judges in New South
Wales now have an expanded supervisory role; Peter Johnson, Controlling Unreasonable
Cross-Examination 21:4 JUD. OFFICERS’ BULL. 29–33 (May 2009).
107. See MacFie supra note 60, and R. v. Sansregret, (1983), 22 Man R (2d) 115, rev’d
(1983), 25 Man R (2d) 123 (CA), aff’d [1985] 1 S.C.R. 570. In each case the assailee lied to the
distraught and violent assailant and pretended to be reconciled with him. The effect was to
calm the assailant, reduce the violence of the confrontation, and once the desired sexual
activity was completed, obtain the assailee’s release by the assailant.
108. Police and prosecutors should be made aware of the role nonconsensual sexual and
nonsexual touching may have in asserting control and eliciting submissive cooperative
behavior; supra note 87.
SEXUAL CONSENT AS VOLUNTARY AGREEMENT | 199
scrutinizing the conduct of the assailee to see whether she or he might have
been responsible for the assailant’s actions(!), to scrutinizing the whole of
the circumstances, including the words and conduct of both parties, and
the significance of the situation in its entirety for the assailee.
If the assailee did not say ‘‘Yes’’ or otherwise communicate agreement to
the activity in question by her words or conduct, there is no consent. If the
assailee said ‘‘Yes’’ by her words or conduct, or it may be alleged that she
did, inquiry must be directed to the circumstances and their legal signif-
icance. Circumstances that are inconsistent with the prerequisites of vol-
untariness and autonomous choice will be circumstances in which the
absence of consent is established as a matter of law for purposes of proof
of the actus reus, even though agreement may have been communicated.
This approach applies regardless of whether the circumstances in question
were created by the assailant’s actions or formed part of the situation in
which the alleged assault took place or both.
By contrast, reliance on the ‘‘‘No’ means ‘No’’’ standard in legal analysis
of consent invites police and prosecutors to scrutinize the assailee’s words
and conduct through the lens of the seduction paradigm and narrowly
focus on the credibility of the assailee’s testimony about her subjective
state of mind. As seen above, many vulnerable persons who are sexually
assaulted are intimidated or manipulated into silence and never report the
assault. Those who do report should not be told they should have said
‘‘No’’ sooner, louder, or more often, or resisted more vigorously. Such
comments reflect an incorrect interpretation of the law.
Use of the proposed approach by police and prosecutors should result in
a change in enforcement patterns in sexual assault cases and, as more cases
proceed to trial, further development of the jurisprudence on voluntariness.
These developments may support a cultural shift on both the cognitive and
rhetorical levels, which in due course, may be reflected in everyday thought
and speech. The seduction paradigm may even come to be best known for
its use in comedy routines that mock the capacity of human beings to
believe what they want to believe. Canadians may begin to think and
speak differently about voluntariness, consent, deference to power, coer-
cion, abuse of power, and betrayal of trust in the context of acquain-
tanceship networks, workplaces, and families. The implications for
interpretation of the law of consent in general, wherever it is shaped by
deeply embedded cultural habits of claiming entitlement and deferring to
power, are obvious.
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CONCLUS ION
This article argues that interpretation and application of the substantive law
of sexual consent must be structured in accordance with the law, not
‘‘common sense’’ or ‘‘ordinary reasonableness.’’ Systematic practices must
be used in the analysis of sexual consent as ‘‘voluntary agreement’’ to ensure
that cases are decided in accordance with the rule of law, not on the basis of
personal assumptions, beliefs, and attitudes, or the ‘‘logic’’ and ‘‘common
sense’’ of the ‘‘seduction’’ paradigm. Each step taken in the process of legal
reasoning must be based on application of law and legal criteria to the facts
established in evidence. The correct questions must be asked, in the proper
legal sequence. Unless the law is applied or mapped onto the facts of
a sexual assault case in the correct sequence—one that gives priority, as
necessary, to questions of law—the legal reasoning process is truncated,
often resulting in erroneous conclusions caused by reliance on factual
inferences based on assumptions and beliefs about the omnipresence and
ubiquity of sexual seduction and its implications for complainant credibil-
ity, rather than on law and legal norms. Stories based on sexual myths,
stereotypes, and cultural paradigms, whether progressive or regressive, may
have a place in novels and plays, harlequin fantasies and comedy routines,
but legal decisions dealing with allegations of sexual assault must be based
on the systematic application of law, legal definitions, and legal norms to
the facts established by evidence. The insights and proposals developed
here in relation to analysis of sexual consent may have implications for the
analysis of consent in other contexts.
The analyses in the article also suggest as a general proposition that the
efficacy of substantive law reform is easily undermined by traditional ap-
proaches to legal reasoning. Two solutions are available. The judiciary can
exercise leadership and take steps to alter the analytic practices routinely
utilized in interpreting and applying the law to the extent that is required to
give reliable and meaningful effect to the concepts and objectives set out in
the law as amended. In the alternative, the reforms themselves can prescribe
the specific sequence of analytic steps to be followed in interpreting and
applying the law as amended. Without one or the other, law reform may
well often fail to achieve any of its objectives that conflict with dominant
cultural norms. In the case of sexual assault, established judicial analytic
practices and habitual patterns of analysis, like case precedents, reflect
previous conceptualizations of ‘‘consent’’ and must be reexamined and
revised. New law, applied as if it were the ‘‘same’’ old law, changes little.
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